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Articles
KNIGHT IN THE DUEL WITH DEATH: PHYSICIAN ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND THE MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE
© DERRICK AUGUSTUS CARTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
S UICIDE and attempted suicide are legal in America. While self-
destruction may be ethically reprehensible,' no state bans sui-
cide and few states ban the inchoate act of attempted suicide.
2
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; J.D. 1975,
Valparaiso University School of Law. In May 1996, this Article won the Thurgood
Marshall Memorial Paper Prize Award, Honorable Mention, from the Southwest-
ern & Southeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference. I wish to
thank JoEllen Lind for her editorial assistance, and Ivan Bodensteiner, Sy Mosko-
witz, Paul Brietzke, Richard Stith andJack Hiller for their comments and help. My
researchers were invaluable, notably Renee George, Wendy Compton, Raphael
Taylor and Brandon Mason Carter.
1. As a matter of public policy, many states discourage suicide through legisla-
tive enactment and case law. For a discussion of state public policy on suicide, see
infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. Nearly every state has an involuntary
forensic commitment proceeding for those who are deemed suicidal and danger-
ous. For a further discussion of involuntary commitment, see infra note 51 and
accompanying text. Many states encourage third parties to prevent suicide and
many states explicitly discourage suicide as a moral wrong. For a further discus-
sion of state law aimed at preventing and discouraging suicide, see infra notes 49-
51 and accompanying text.
2. In rejoseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983) (discussing American legal
view of suicide). The court observed:
Under American law, suicide has never been punished and the ancient
English attitude has been expressly rejected. Rather than classifying sui-
cide as criminal, suicide in the United States "has continued to be consid-
ered an expression of mental illness." As one commentator has noted,
"punishing suicide is contrary to modem penal and psychological
theory."
Attempted suicide was also a crime at common law. A few American
jurisdictions have adopted this view, but most... attach no criminal lia-
bility to one who makes a suicide attempt.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional
Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 148-242 (1985) (providing historical summary of each
state's legal history with suicide, attempted suicide and assisted suicide). In the
seminal American case of Burnett v. People, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (I1. 1903), the court
stated that it had never "seen fit to define what character of burial our citizens
shall enjoy ... [nor] regarded the English law as to suicide as applicable." Id. In
Sanders v. State, 112 S.W. 68, 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908), overruled by State v. Aven,
277 S.W. 1080 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925), the court declared, "Whatever may have
been the law in England... so far as our law is concerned .... suicide is innocent
of criminality." Id. In the few states which regarded suicide as criminal, punish-
(663)
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Most states prohibit assisted suicide, however, as being equivalent to
murder, manslaughter or a lesser felony. 3 Physician assisted suicide
contemplates the assistance of a physician who prescribes lethal
drugs or provides other lethal means, to a terminally ill patient.4 In
such cases, the physician does not administer the drugs; the final
choice to consume the drugs rests with the patient. This assistance
allows the patient to die peacefully, rather than prolong death's as-
sault. Those who aid in a suicide may be caught, however, in a web
ment was unenforced. See HERBERT HENDIN, SUICIDE IN AMERICA 44 (1995) (observ-
ing that American courts never embraced English common law view of suicide).
3. For a discussion of the treatment of assisted suicide by the various states,
see infra note 56 and accompanying text. Only the State of Oregon has legisla-
tively authorized physician assisted suicide, after the proposed measure met with
public passage as a ballot referendum. This progressive state statute provides a
detailed procedure for physician assisted suicide when one is tormented by a ter-
minal illness. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.800-
127.897 (1995) [hereinafter Measure 16]. The validity of this statute, however, is
in question. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1428 (D. Or. 1995) (holding
that Measure 16 violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
For a further discussion of Measure 16, see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
Conversely, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Second Circuits
have recently declared that statutes banning assisted suicide for terminally ill pa-
tients are unconstitutional based on equal protection and substantive due process
grounds. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718 (2d Cir.) (holding that ban on physi-
cian assisted suicide violated Equal Protection Clause), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36
(1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 799-839 (9th Cir.) (en
banc) (holding that ban on physician assisted suicide unconstitutionally interferes
with liberty interest of terminally ill patients to hasten their own deaths), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). While the United
States Supreme Court may very well reject the liberty interest and equal protection
holdings of the Ninth and Second Circuits, the Court might honor a state's statu-
tory scheme as invoking a choice in the manner of death. See Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) (holding that state's statu-
tory scheme regulating decision to terminate life of person in persistent vegetative
state does not violate Due Process Clause). For a further discussion of Cruzan, see
infra note 55 and accompanying text. Although the Ninth and Second Circuits
have carved a sudden protected interest in the face of century-old statutes banning
assisted suicide, many states continue to statutorily ban assisted suicide. Michigan,
however, is one of the states that judicially bans assisted suicide. Michigan is also
where former physician Jack Kevorkian has been prosecuted in three cases for as-
sisted suicide, all of which have resulted in acquittal.
4. Several definitions are noteworthy. "Active or positive euthanasia" is the
affirmative killing by any person for the sake of relieving suffering. See Joseph
Fletcher, In Defense of Suicide, reprinted in SUICIDE: RIGHT OR WRONG? 61, 70 (John
Donnelly ed., 1990) (discussing current attitudes toward suicide). "Passive or neg-
ative euthanasia" is the killing by omission in letting one die to relieve suffering.
Id. at 69. "Active suicide" is the intentional killing of oneself by an affirmative act,
and "passive suicide" is the intentional killing of oneself by omission. Id. "Assisted
suicide" involves a person actively aiding in another person's suicide. For a collec-
tion of philosophical and legal essays on killing versus "letting die," see KILLING
AND LErrING DIE (Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 1994).
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of criminality, 5 because consent is not a defense to physician as-
sisted suicide.6 Traditionally, courts have viewed a life as sacred,
regardless of how muted its quality or how kindly the motive to kill.
The criminal law tolerates no lesser standard based on the victim's
quality of life.7
Criminal prosecutions generally and necessarily hinge on the
purpose, exculpation and justification of the actor, yet assisted sui-
cide prosecutions ignore purpose and excuse.8 Thus, in attempting
to defend against such prosecutions, the physician may attempt to
invoke defenses such as causation or mistake of law.9 In recent as-
5. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 197-203, 561-62, 880-92 (6th ed. 1995) (delineating repercussions in
criminal system for those who aid suicide); WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,
JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 7.8, at 649-52 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing possible criminal liabil-
ity for aiding or abetting suicide).
6. See Helen Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U.
PA. L. REv. 350, 380 (1954) ("'Invitation and consent' to the perpetration of homi-
cide 'do not constitute defenses, adequate excuses or provocations."' (quoting
Martin v. Commonwealth, 37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (Va. 1946))). See generallyJohn H. Der-
rick, Criminal Liability for Death of Another as Result of Accused's Attempt to Kill Self or
Assist Another's Suicide, 40 A.L.R. 4TH 702, 709-14 (1985) (discussing general history
of assisted and attempted suicide).
7. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690, 691 (Mich. 1920) (holding that
providing means of suicide to terminally ill wife is murder at common law), over-
ruled in part by People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (overruling
Roberts to extent that it holds that providing means of suicide is murder rather than
common law felony), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
8. SeeJohn D. Conomy, The Death of a Person: Ethics, the Practice of Medicine and
the Law, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 717, 721 (1993) ("The law deals with intent, not
motivation. It doesn't look to that reason when it comes to the life of another
person, or the taking of that person's life."). See generally William E. Mikell, Is Sui-
cide Murder?, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1903) (describing various decisions holding
suicide to be murder, yet imposing punishment of mere forfeiture).
9. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 144 (1987). The mis-
take of law defense requires that: (1) the accused mistakenly believed that his or
her conduct fell outside the scope of the criminal statute, and (2) the accused's
misunderstanding of the law was based on an official but erroneous interpretation
of the law, such as from reliance on judicial opinions. Id. See, e.g.,JoAN BROVINS &
THOMAS OEHMKE, DR. DEATH: DR. JACK KEVORKIAN'S Rx 45-61 (1993) (hearing
about assisted suicide acquittals of Jack Kevorkian, Mr. Bertram Harper flew his
terminally ill wife from their home in California to Michigan, he then assisted in
his wife's suicide and was acquitted of second degree murder).
Moreover, after Jack Kevorkian's third trial for assisted suicide ended in an
acquittal, one juror explained her reasoning in finding that Dr. Kevorkian should
not have been even charged for wrongdoing. Kevorkian Again Cleared by Jury;
Lawmaker Says Legislature Must Confront Issue, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1996, § 1, at 4
(finding case was unique in that prosecution attempted to retroactively apply 1994
Michigan Supreme Court decision to acts that occurred in 1991). The juror ex-
plained that the fundamental principles of legality and ex post facto law guided
their decision in the verdict, such that no conduct is criminal and punishable un-
less and until the legislature makes the conduct a crime. Id. The juror also stated
that the jury believed Dr. Kevorkian's testimony that he did not think assisted sui-
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sisted suicide prosecutions against Michigan physician Jack Kevor-
kian, a new defense emerged, which asserts the theory of "double-
effect" in order to challenge the issue of purpose in the physician's
allegedly unlawful actions. The theory of "double effect" posits that
the physician's intent was not to cause death, but to relieve suffer-
ing, and that death was a collateral consequence.1 0 In addition to
this stated defense, the physician may also receive the benefits of
jury nullification. While jury nullification may explain the prevail-
ing number of historical acquittals in cases concerning euthanasia,
it is not a legally cognizable defense.11
This Article proposes a formal recognition of a medical neces-
sity defense to assisted suicide.12 This defense incorporates the
cide was a crime in Michigan. Id. "We felt that Dr. Kevorkian had made an honest
effort to research that, to stay within the bounds of the written law." Id.
10. For a discussion of the "double effect" principle, see infra notes 209, 271-
77 and accompanying text.
11. See David R. Schanker, Note, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation,
and the Health Care Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977, 985-86 (1993) (suggesting that acquittals
in euthanasia cases hinge on tolerance of assisted suicide byjuries). Thejury nulli-
fication theory accounts for the prevailing number of historical acquittals for those
indicted for assisted suicide. Under jury nullification, the jury has the power to
enter an acquittal contrary to the law and to the court's instructions. See United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (canvassing history of
jury nullification and upholding jury nullification). While the jury is not in-
structed on this power and is specifically told that the case must be based, not on
sympathy, but on the evidence and the court's instructions, the jury can simply
refuse to enforce a law of which it disapproves. Id. Defense attorneys are not al-
lowed to argue or even suggest ajury nullification defense. Id. If the jury nullifies
the law, however, the verdict will stand. Id.; see also STANLEY M. ROSENBLATT, MuR-
DER OF MERCY 13-15, 289-90 (1992) (describing attorney's defense in Florida eutha-
nasia case by indirectly relying on jury nullification).
Nearly all reported cases of physician assisted suicide have resulted in dis-
missed charges or an acquittal. See Schanker, supra, at 986-91 (noting cases since
1949 where physicians were acquitted for assisted suicide); see also MICHAEL
BETZOLD, APPOINTMENT WITH DOCTOR DEATH 328 (1993) (noting former physician
Jack Kevorkian was acquitted in assisted suicide of Thomas Hyde, although prose-
cutions for dozens of his other assisted suicides remain pending); ROSENBLATT,
supra, at 336-37 (recounting acquittal of Dr. Peter Rosier in Florida for assisting in
suicide of his wife); Antonios P. Tsarouhas, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide,
20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 793, 798-99 (1993) (describing several more reported prose-
cutions of physician assisted suicide since 1935 where none of physicians were con-
victed). There have been, however, a couple cases where the person assisting in
another's suicide either plead guilty or was actually found guilty. See, e.g., BROVINS
& OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 236 (noting that, in 1988, Dr. Donald Caraccio pled
guilty in Michigan and served five years probation for injecting potassium chloride
into terminally ill patient); ROSENBLATr, supra, at 15 (noting that Roswell Gilbert
was convicted in Florida and received 25 years in prison for assisting in death of his
terminally ill wife, only to be later pardoned by governor); id. at 342 (detailing how
Dr. Timothy Quill was nearly indicted for assisting in suicide of his wife).
12. Several authors and cases propose, without elaboration, a medical neces-
sity defense to euthanasia. See, e.g., Robin Isenberg, Note, Medical Necessity as a
Defense to Criminal Liability: United States v. Randall, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 273,
666
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss3/5
PHYsIcIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
value of both the "double effect" principle and jury nullification.
While a number of courts have examined the constitutionality of
the issue of an individual's "choice" surrounding the right to die or
have gone on to declare assisted suicide statutes unconstitutional, 13
this Article assumes the validity of assisted suicide statutes and tradi-
tional murder theories. Further, it conceptualizes a criminal de-
fense based on medical necessity or choice of evils.' 4 The virtue of
the medical necessity defense is that it implements a new right of
"choice" through an old "necessity" remedy which balances individ-
ual needs, values concerning life and governmental prohibitions. 15
The defense also legitimizes the jury's predisposition to acquit the
physician in the face of a clear violation of the law and avoids the
impropriety of jury nullification. On a case-by-case determination,
the defense offers a uniform resolution to a compelling issue; it
circumvents constitutional quagmires, provides a remedy in ex-
treme cases and provokes legislative reform.
Part II of this Article details the history of suicide and at-
tempted suicide and then explores the reasons most states prohibit
assisted suicide. 16 In addition, it analyzes the clinical environment
of those suffering from terminal illnesses and their consequent
legal dilemma. Part III describes "the choice of evils" embedded in
297 (1978) ("The theory of medical necessity... is capable of providing the safe-
guards sought by critics of euthanasia legalization.... Use of the defense of medi-
cal necessity in euthanasia cases would thus lead to the articulation of more precise
standards governing the practice of euthanasia than prevail in present medical
practice."). See generally H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Michele Malloy, Suicide and
Assisting Suicide: A Critique of Legal Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1029-30 (1982) (cit-
ing instances where courts appear to allow defense of medical necessity). By al-
lowing the defense of medical necessity, physicians would be able "to contribute to
the free choice of patients ... [by providing] materials for the suicide of rational
individuals." Id. at 1024.
13. Several recent decisions have upheld the constitutionality of assisted sui-
cide charges. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 724-33 (Mich. 1994) (up-
holding Michigan law banning assisted suicide), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995);
see also Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (holding that statute
authorizing assisted suicide is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds). But
see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.) (holding that assisted suicide prohibition
violated Equal Protection Clause), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996); Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (holding assisted sui-
cide prohibition violated constitution), revd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. 37 (1996). The Supreme Court will address the assisted suicide issue in
1996-97 session.
14. See Isenberg, supra note 12, at 297-98 (arguing that medical necessity de-
fense relies on common law doctrine of choice of evils but with more precision
and safeguards).
15. Id.
16. For a discussion of suicide and assisted suicide, see infra notes 20-132 and
accompanying text.
1996] 667
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the medical necessity defense and the paradox of asserting a de-
fense that enlists death rather than life. 17 Part IV applies the medi-
cal necessity factors to an assisted suicide prosecution. 18 Part V
concludes with a discussion of the societal ramifications of the med-
ical necessity defense.1 9
II. SUICIDE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
A. History of Suicide
Physician assisted suicide is a form of euthanasia and has its
recorded origins with the ancient Greeks. The term "euthanasia"
means painless, happy death20 and contemplates the termination of
human life by tranquil means for the purpose of ending severe
physical suffering.21 Some of the ancient Greeks and Romans en-
couraged suicide by teaching that it was a person's right to die by
choice and without compromise.22
17. For a discussion of the medical necessity defense, see infra notes 133-74
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of applying the medical necessity defense to assisted sui-
cide, see infra notes 175-285 and accompanying text. See Edward B. Arnolds &
Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the
LesserEvil, 65J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974) (stating that factors of medical
necessity defense include reasonable belief, expert medical authority, imminent
harm, exhaustion of remedies, fault and societal harm).
19. For a discussion of the societal ramifications of the medical necessity de-
fense, see infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
20. Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 794; see BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 554 (6th ed.
1990) (defining euthanasia as "[t]he act or practice of putting to death persons
suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy").
21. See Aida A. Koury, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide for the Terminally Ill: The
Ultimate Cure?, 33 Apaz. L. REv. 677, 678-79 (1991) (exploring lack of choice the
terminally ill currently have); see also Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy
Death: From Ancient Greece to Beyond Cruzan Toward a Reasoned Legal Response to the
Societal Dilemma of Euthanasia, 71 DEN,. U. L. REv. 175, 177 & n.16 (1993) (recount-
ing horrific story regarding suffering of stomach cancer patient who was resusci-
tated multiple times despite his expressed desire to die).
22. See A.W. Mair, Suicide, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 26-27
(James Hastings ed., 1922) (stating that earliest reference to suicide is found in
poems of Homer, wherein suicide is not condemned, but is celebrated as heroic
nature). Classical Greek suicide allowed citizens the opportunity to plead their
cause for suicide before the Senate. The precepts were clear:
Whoever no longer wishes to live shall state his reasons to the Senate, and
after having received permission shall abandon life. If your existence is
hateful to you, die; if you are overwhelmed by fate, drink the hemlock. If
you are bowed with grief, abandon life. Let the unhappy man recount his
misfortune, let the magistrate supply him with the remedy, and his
wretchedness will come to an end.
ALFRED ALVAREZ, THE SAVAGE GOD: A STUDY OF SUICIDE 61 (1972). This pro-sui-
cide view was reinforced by Roman law. According to the Justinians, "if someone
puts an end to his life through taedium vitae or unendurable pain of some kind, or
otherwise, he has a successor .... [A] person's motive for committing suicide is
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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Conversely, many philosophers rallied against suicide as being
cowardly, undignified and abusive.2 3 The influence of Christianity
that fbllowed then instructed that euthanasia was immoral and un-
civilized because human life belonged to the deity alone.24 Follow-
relevant .... For he should by all means be punished unless he was compelled to
do so by taedium vitae or unendurable pain of some kind." 4 THE DIGEST OFJUSTIN-
IAN 858 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985). Roman philosopher and Stoic,
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 B.C.- 65 A.D.), who was accused of conspiring to kill the
Roman Emperor Nero and who subsequently committed suicide, also sanctioned
suicide. Seneca proclaimed:
If one death is accompanied by torture, and the other is simple and easy,
why snatch the latter? Just as I shall select my ship when I am about to go
on a voyage, or my house when I propose to take a residence, so I shall
choose my death when I am about to depart from life. Moreover, just as a
long-drawn-out life does not necessarily mean a better one, so a long-
drawn-out death necessarily means a worse one. There is no occasion
when the soul should be humored more than at the moment of death.
Let the soul depart as it feels itself impelled to go, whether it seeks the
sword, or the halter, or some draught that attacks the veins, let it proceed
and burst the bonds of its slavery. Every man ought to make his life ac-
ceptable to others besides himself, but his death to himself alone.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On the Proper Time to Slip the Cable, reprinted in SUICIDE:
RIGHT OR WRONG?, supra note 4, at 27, 29 (footnote omitted).
23. According to Pythagoras of Samos (580-500 B.C.), death was a process of
reincarnation, and suicide constituted a violation of the continuum of a divine law
and was consequently immoral. See Marzen et al., supra note 2, at 21 (articulating
role of suicide in ancient Greco-Roman culture). The Greek philosopher Socrates
also thought suicide was immoral. He believed that all humans were the subjects
of the gods, and that no one had the right to dispose of their own lives because this
would provoke the gods. Id. at 21-22. Ironically, Socrates committed suicide at the
direction of the State upon his conviction for irreligion. Id. See generally I.F.
STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 133-247 (1989) (discussing prosecution of Socra-
tes). The Greek philosopher Plato found suicide to be an act of cowardice. Plato
reasoned that "the man who thus gives unrighteous sentence against himself from
mere poltroonery and unmanly cowardice . . .(and such people) must have no
companions whatsoever in the tomb. Furthermore, they must be buried ignomini-
ously in waste and nameless spots . . .and the tomb shall be marked by neither
headstone nor name." PLATO, LAws 873c-e, reprinted in COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 1432 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961); see Plato, Apology,
in TEN GREAT WORs OF PHILOSOPHY 11-36, (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1969). The
Greek philosopher Aristotle also believed that suicide was the act of a coward:
But to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or
from pain or sorrow, is not the act of a courageous man, but rather of a
coward; for it is weakness to fly from troubles, and the suicide does not
endure death because it is noble to do so, but to escape evil.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS III 161 (H. Rackham trans., 1926).
24. Saint Augustine (354-430 A.D.) condemned suicide as violative of the
Sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." See 2 WHITNEYJ. OATES, BASIC WRIT-
INGS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE 27, 28 (1948) (explaining why Christians have no author-
ity for committing suicide). Saint Augustine recognized only two exceptions for
murder: (1) killing pursuant to a just, generally applicable law, such as in war or
capital punishment, and (2) killing by special edict from God, such as with Samson
and Abraham. Id.; see also St. Thomas Aquinas, Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Oneself?,
reprinted in SUICIDE: RIGHT OR WRONG?, supra note 4, at 33-36 (noting that Thomas
Aquinas shared view that suicide is always sinful).
19961
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ing Christ's crucifixion and legacy, "suffering" promised a
rewarding afterlife.25
Throughout the ages, religious intolerance, political 'strife,
health crises and the ravages of war have created natural scripts for
individual and mass suicides.2 6 During the times of the black
plague and cholera epidemics, great numbers of people committed
suicide rather than suffer the slow and painful indignities of the
disease.2 7 In the Middle Ages, many treatises re-introduced the art
of dying well, ars moriendi, as a way to avoid a tortuous death.28 At
the time, the Catholic Church's opprobrium towards suicide was
compromised by its own need to excuse the voluntary suicides of
the devout Christian martyrs, who accelerated their own deaths by
25. See Fletcher, supra note 4, at 66 (noting that Saint Augustine held suicide
to be objectionable because "[o]ur duty is to bear suffering with fortitude; to es-
cape is to evade our role as soldiers of Christ"); see a/SoJACQUES CHORON, SUICIDE
103 (1972) (discussing religious opposition to suicide and euthanasia). Choron
observed:
As far as an "easy death" is concerned, it is not what the true Christian
primarily aspires to. "The believer has the extraordinary advantage of
knowing that in reality death is punishment imposed for having sinned,
and necessary for man in order for him to be able to expiate his crime."
Thus, for a Christian, physical death is not even supposed to be "easy."
Christ himself suffered a horrible and painful death. The agony of dying
is made easier to bear by the hope of eternal life, but the ordeal must be
borne with resignation.
Id. (quoting Blaise Pascal, Vie de Blaise Pascal, in PENSEES ET OPUSCULES 37 (12th ed.
1924).
26. See ALvAREZ, supra note 22, at 56-57 (discussing how natives in New World
performed mass genocides to avert cruel tendencies of Spanish Colonists). See gen-
erally NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW 246-52 (1961) (tracing
formation of Western view of suicide).
27. See DANIEL DEFOE, HISTORY OF THE PLAGUE IN LONDON 87 (1894) (detail-
ing sufferings of Londoners during plague epidemic of 1665); see alsoJOHANNES
NOHL, THE BLACK DEATH: A CHRONICLE OF THE PLAGUE 32 (C.H. Clarke trans.,
1924) (describing suicides to escape torments of plague). Commenting upon the
suffering endured by Londoners during the plague epidemic, Defoe stated:
It is scarce credible what dreadful cases happened in particular families
every day,-people, in the rage of the distemper, or in the torment of
their swellings, which was indeed intolerable, running out of their own
government, raving and distracted, and oftentimes laying violent hands
upon themselves, etc.; mothers murdering their own children in their
lunacy; some dying of mere grief as a passion, some of mere fright and
surprise without any infection at all; others frightened into idiotism and
foolish distractions, some into despair and lunacy, others into melancholy
madness.
DEFOE, supra, at 87.
28. SeeJACQUES CHORON, DEATH AND WESTERN THOUGHT 97, 135, 267 (1963)
(finding ars moriendi involves "mastering the fear of death and preventing it from
poisoning the enjoyment of life").
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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self-deprivation, asceticism and self-sacrifice,2 9 as well as the chaste
women who killed themselves to protect their virginity.30 Nonethe-
less, at the Council of Braga in 563 A.D., the Church decided that
all who committed suicide were to be punished posthumously.3'
Despite the practical inability to prevent suicide, the English
common law proscribed it for the secular reason that the King had
a superior legal interest over his subjects and for the moral reason
that every life belonged to God.3 2 The English courts attempted to
29. Saint Augustine condemned the practice of liberal martyrdom. G. STEVEN
NEELEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE: A LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL Ex-
AMINATION 40 (1994). Neeley writes:
It became commonplace for fanatical Christians to taunt their Roman
persecutors into acts of violence. The sect whom Saint Augustine particu-
larly noted for this practice was the Circumcelliones: "these people not
only sought out martyrdom, profaning the temples of paganism in order
to be executed, but, when all other expedients failed, cast themselves by
the hundred in ecstasy from lofty cliffs, till the rocks below were red-
dened with their blood." "To kill themselves," said Augustine, "out of
respect for martyrdom is their daily sport."
Id. (citations omitted).
30. OATES, supra note 24, at 24. Saint Augustine attempted to reverse self-
imposed martyrdom by teaching that chastity is not lost through external circum-
stances when one is compelled to yield to the control of another. Saint Augustine
explained that:
[A] woman who has been violated by the sin of another, and without any
consent of her own, has no cause to put herself to death; much less has
she cause to commit suicide in order to avoid such violation, for in that
case she commits certain homicide to prevent a crime which is ... not
her own.
Id.
31. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 249. Several canonical directives pro-
hibited suicide. "The Council of Arles (452 A.D.), for example, incorporated the
Roman law's forfeiture of a suicide's estate. The Council of Braga (563 A.D.)
banned religious rites for suicides. The Antisidor Council (590 A.D.) provided
penalties for suicide, and the Synod of Nimes (1284 A.D.) denied suicides Chris-
tian burial." Marzen et al., supra note 2, at 28-29; see also ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra
note 26, at 249 (discussing Church doctrine on suicide as expressed in Church
law).
32. The early English decision of Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (1562), pro-
hibited suicide for several reasons:
[Suicide is a]gainst nature, because it is contrary to the rules of self-pres-
ervation, which is the principle of nature, for every thing living does by
instinct of nature defend itself from destruction, and then to destroy
one's self is contrary to nature, and a thing most horrible. Against God,
in that it is a breach of His commandment, thou shalt not kill; and to kill
himself, by which act he kills in presumption his own soul, is a greater
offence than to kill another. Against the King in that hereby he has lost a
subject, and.., he being the head has lost one of his mystical members.
Also he has offended the King, in giving such an example to his subjects,
and it belongs to the King, who has the government of the people, to take
care that no evil example be given them, and an evil example is an of-
fence against him.
Id. at 400. John Locke also proposed that human life belonged to God and that
each person was a temporary bodily tenant. Suicide was a theft or embezzlement
9
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enforce a ban on suicide through threatened forfeiture of real and
personal property, ignominious burial and bodily desecration, un-
less the person was proven to have been insane.3 3 Relatives were
also publicly humiliated. Often, the nature of the suicide in ques-
tion would dictate the peculiar punishment imposed by law. A sui-
cide committed from shame and guilt occasioned by some misdeed
would result in the forfeiture of the person's real estate and chattel,
whereas a suicide committed from the ravages of a disease would
result in the mere forfeiture of chattel.34 A suicide committed from
insanity would result in no forfeiture or ignominy. 35
The Renaissance Period conceptualized suicide as both an al-
ternative to ignominy and insanity and the result of a melancholic
disposition.3 6 Thus, suicide became the thinking man's solution to
the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.137 William Shake-
from God. SeeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (Peter Laslett
ed., 1960) ("For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent... are his
Property, . . . made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure.... Every one...
is bound to preserve himself .. ").
33. See 2 HENRICUS DE BRACTON, HENRICI DE BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUE-
TUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 505-09 (Sir Travers Twiss ed., 1883) (noting that penalty for
suicide depended on circumstances and could include forfeiture of goods and/or
depriving heirs of inheritance); see also L.B. CURZON, ENGUSH LEGAL HISTORY 241-
42 (2d ed. 1979) (" [S] elf-slaughter was a felony and, hence, resulted in forfeiture
of the good belonging to the person who had killed himself .... [T]he corpse of
the suicide was transfixed with a stake and was buried along a highway."); 3 WIL-
LIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 315-16 (3d ed. 1923) (noting
that suicide resulted in forfeiture of goods except when person was of "unsound
mind" or "slew himself by misadventure").
34. See Mikell, supra note 8, at 379 ("If he commits suicide 'from weariness of
life or impatience of pain,' his lands descend to his heir and his chattels only are to
be confiscated.").
35. See Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Assisted Suicide in Early
America: A Comparison with the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 57, 75 (1982)
(stating that madness or illness often established defense to suicide under English
law).
36. See Marzen et al., supra note 2, at 31-32 (stating John Donne's view that
each suicide must be judged individually and may even be justified and acceptable
to God). Clergyman Robert Burton explored the cure of melancholy and ques-
tioned the accepted value that those who commit suicide are eternally damned.
Id. Other Enlightenment thinkers in Europe, such as Montesquieu and Voltaire
also presented new and changed views on suicide. Id. at 31; see also John Donne and
the Renaissance, in ALVAREZ, supra note 22, at 149 (noting that Donne offered first
English defense of suicide). Philosopher David Hume argued that the Laws of
Nature do not prohibit suicide because we have the right and obligation to inter-
fere with nature for the evolution of society. David Hume, On Suicide, in SUICIDE:
RIGHT OR WRONG?, supra note 4, at 37-43 (applying principles of natural law to
decision whether to commit suicide). But see Immanuel Kant, Lectures in Ethics,
reprinted in SUICIDE: RIGHT OR WRONG?, supra note 4, at 47-48 ("Man cannot have
any power of disposal in regard to himself and his life.").
37. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, at 56-84 (G.R. Hibbard ed.,
1987) (quoting portion of Hamlet's famous "to be or not to be" soliloquy on yearn-
10
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speare's Hamlet was the epitome of the beguiled Renaissance man:
"To be or not to be, that is the question."38
American common law abolished the prohibitions against sui-
cide and attempted suicide because such acts lacked criminal culpa-
bility and necessitated compassion, medical treatment and
sympathy for both the legacy of the decedent and innocent surviv-
ing relatives.3 9 Forfeiture, ignominious burial and bodily desecra-
tions became contrary to penal, medical and psychological theory.
Moreover, such treatment would contravene the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition of the United States Constitution by dis-
proportionately isolating excusable mental illness as criminal con-
duct.40 Additionally, American homicide statutes eliminated the
prerequisite element of the taking of any life, which formerly in-
cluded one's own life, and substituted the taking of the life of an-
other in order to constitute murder.41
For a brief time, attempted suicide remained criminal so as to
deter others and to enable the person to receive treatment.42
Thereafter, attempted suicide statutes were rescinded for several
ing for, yet fearing, death). The French novelist Camus recognized that: "There is
but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether
life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of
philosophy." John Donnelly, Introduction to SUICIDE: RIGHT OR WRONG?, supra
note 4, at 7.
38. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 37, act 3, sc. 1, at 56-84; see also DANIEL J. KORN-
STEIN, KILL ALL THE L.wYEPs? SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL 97 (1994) (proffering
that Hamlet exhibits traits of melancholy law student).
39. For a discussion of the American legal approach to suicide, see supra
notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
40. Thomas Jefferson also opposed the English laws against suicide because
forfeiture was too severe a measure in punishing innocent heirs. He believed
these provisions of English law to be overbearing and stated:
[T] hat your petitioner hath been further advised that under the present
form of government the disposal of confiscated chattels is in your Excel-
lency and your honors, and hopes it will appear to you that the rigorous
laws of escheat and forfeiture, invented by a spirit of rapine and hostility
of princes towards their subjects in the most bar[barous] times, and relin-
quished in practice by them in later and more humanized ages will be
thought inconsistent with the principles of moderation and justice which
principally endear a republican government to it's citizens....
6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 155 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1952) (citations omitted).
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(1) (1975) (stating that Alabama Criminal
Code does not apply to suicide, because requisite killing must be of "another person"
(emphasis added)). 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501(a) (1996) ("[A] person is guilty of
criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes
the death of another human being."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1980) ("A
person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or neg-
ligently causes the death of another human being.").
42. See ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 257-59 (discussing arguments for
and against retaining crime of attempted suicide).
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reasons. First, as an inchoate offense, "attempt crimes" were predi-
cated on the criminality of a completed offense. When the com-
pleted act of suicide was no longer a criminal offense, then
attempting to commit suicide, as a matter of law, could no longer
be a crime. 43 Second, the policy of forfeiture unjustly punished in-
nocent relatives. 44 Without forfeiture or ignominious burial as a
sanction, attempted suicide statutes became ineffective. 45 Third,
those who attempted suicide suffered mental illness, diminished ca-
pacity and despondency comparable to those who completed their
suicides.46 Finally, attempted suicide statutes only encouraged and
43. A seminal case reflecting this view is Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass.
162 (1870). In Dennis, the court noted that a Massachusetts statute provided that
punishment for any attempted crime was to be no more than one-half the punish-
ment for such a completed crime. Id. The court also noted, however, that the
completed act of suicide was not punishable. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned an
attempted suicide could not be punishable. Id. This view was also shared by other
states. See, e.g., May v. Pennel, 64 A. 885 (Me. 1906) (holding that attempted sui-
cide is not illegal); Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Pa. D. 144, 145-46 (Phila. 1902)
(same).
44. See Marzen et al., supra note 2, at 68-69 (1985) (discussing effects of forfei-
ture on innocent heirs). Zephaniah Swift, later Chief Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, wrote in a 1796 treatise that the abolition of forfeiture was primar-
ily directed to the innocent relatives:
"There can be no greater cruelty, than the inflicting a punishment, as the
forfeiture of goods, which must fall solely on the innocent offspring of
the offender. This odious practice has been attempted to be justified
upon the principle, that such forfeiture will tend to deter mankind from
the commission of such crimes, from a regard to their families. But it is
evident that where a person is so destitute of affection for his family, and
regardless of the pleasures of life, as to wish to put an end to his exist-
ence, that he will not be deterred by a consideration of their future
subsistence."
Id. (quoting S. MILSOM, HIsTORIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW, at vi (2d
ed. 1982); see also id. at 181 (noting that Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
recognized that forfeiture "may well have had its origin in consideration for the
feelings of innocent surviving relatives" (citing Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass.
422, 429 (1877)); cf. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 258 (discussing Roman law
punishment of forfeiture).
45. See ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 258 (noting that "it is difficult to see
what deterrent value the law [on attempt] has, and it seems more likely to ensure
that the person genuinely attempting to end his life will make a good job of it").
St. John-Stevas further explains that imprisonment may well retard recovery and
does nothing to stop a second and successful attempt on release. Id. Furthermore,
the knowledge that attempted suicide is a crime may discourage an attempter from
seeking help, or lead his relations and friends to conceal it. Id.
46. See Marzen et al., supra note 2, at 202 (explaining ramifications or abolish-
ing criminal treatment of suicide). When, for instance, the State of New Jersey
finally abolished the offense of attempting suicide in 1972, the legislature simulta-
neously enacted a provision authorizing involuntary commitment for mental
health care of anyone attempting suicide: "Any person who attempts to commit
suicide shall fall under the jurisdiction of the involuntary commitment and subject
to temporary hospitalization as provided herein." Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-
26:3a (West 1981)) (footnote ommited).
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fostered the commitment to succeed in the suicide. 47 The de-
criminalization of suicide and attempted suicide occurred because
the criminal law was inadequate to deal with acts which were the
result of mental illness or despondency.
The right to commit suicide was never considered a "funda-
mental right" or a liberty interest.48 Many states condemn suicide
as immoral49 and have even passed legislation immunizing good sa-
maritans, who attempt to thwart a suicide, from liability.50 These
exemption statutes encourage the prevention of suicide and au-
thorize involuntary commitment to forcibly confine a suicidal per-
son in a mental health facility.5 1 Moreover, suicide often places an
undue burden on the government to inherit the care of surviving
47. See id. at 211 (describing how one commentator felt that North Carolina's
anti-suicide measure would merely make suicide attempts more successful).
48. In Bisenius v. Karns, 165 N.W.2d 377 (Wis.), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 709
(1969), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that "successful suicide is no longer
within the reach of the law, but it does not follow that self-destruction is a legally
protected right of individuals.... It is a 'grave public wrong."' Id. at 382 (quoting
Stiles v. Clifton Spring Sanatarium Co., 74 F. Supp. 907, 909 (W.D.N.Y. 1947)). In
Tennessee ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), the Supreme Court of
Tennessee similarly held that "[a] n attempt to commit suicide is probably not an
indictable offense under Tennessee law; however, such an attempt would consti-
tute a grave public wrong, and we hold that the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the life ... of its citizens." Id. at 113 (holding public policy militated
that practice of handling poisonous snakes as part of religious services be perpetu-
ally enjoined).
49. See Marzen et al., supra note 2, at 212 (noting that Dakota Territory pro-
vided that: "Although suicide is deemed a grave public wrong, yet from the impos-
sibility of reaching the successful perpetrator, no forfeiture is imposed").
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered attempted suicide "ethically
reprehensible" and "inconsistent with the public welfare." Id. at 178 (citing May v.
Pennel, 101 Me. 516 (1906)). An intermediate appellate court upheld an order
authorizing the forced feeding of Mark Chapman, John Lennon's assassin, on the
grounds that "the preservation of life has a high social value in our culture and
suicide is deemed a 'grave public wrong."' Id. at 210 (citing Von Holden v. Chap-
man, 87 A.2d 66, 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
50. See id. at 148-242 (discussing suicide laws of every state). For example, the
Arkansas Code provides that: "A person who reasonably believes that another per-
son is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself
may use non deadly physical force upon that person to the extent reasonably nec-
essary to thwart the result." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605(4) (Michie 1993). These
exemption statutes are common in many states. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
703(d) (1986) (allowing exemption); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-18 (1994) (same);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10(4) (McKinney 1975) (same).
51. Most states have enacted statutes requiring a showing of "dangerousness"
to oneself or to others be manifested in recent overt behavior. See, e.g., CAL. WELu.
& INST. CODE §§ 5260, 5300 (West 1981) (allowing involuntary commitment when
person "presents an imminent threat" of suicide); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 334-359
(1993) (allowing involuntary commitment when person is "imminently dangerous
to self and others"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 1992) (allowing
involuntary commitment when person "presents likelihood of serious harm to
others or himself"); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.15, 51.20 (West 1987) (allowing involun-
13
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dependents. 52 Further, in an attempt to prevent insurance fraud,
courts deny life insurance claims to the beneficiaries of those who
commit suicide. 53
While there is no fundamental right to commit suicide or to
attempt to commit suicide, there is a liberty interest recognized in
the right-to-die cases that sanctions an individual's choice to termi-
nate medical care. 54 This right of choice is embedded in the pri-
vacy claim that one may reject invasive medical procedures. This
liberty interest is not absolute and must be balanced against the
state's interest in preserving the integrity of life. The state's interest
in preserving life wanes, however, and the individual's right of
choice grows as the person nears death.55
tary commitment when person presents "substantial probability" of physical harm
to self or others).
52. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rice, 52 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. 1944)
("Aside from the purely moral aspects of self-destruction, the most plausible argu-
ment in favor of the view that public policy forbids recovery in a case like the one
at bar is that suicide places an undue burden upon the government to care for the
perpetrator's dependents.").
53. ROSENBLATr, supra note 11, at 186. A standard provision exists in life in-
surance policies called a three-year contemplation of death clause, which provides
that a suicide within three years of the policy would deem the insurance null and
void. Id. In Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 (1898), the Supreme Court
held that even an insurance policy, which was silent with regard to suicide, could
not obligate an insurance company to pay benefits on behalf of an insured who
took his life. Id. at 154. Justice Harlan explained:
If, therefore, a policy ... expressly provided for the payment of the sum
stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind, took his own life, the
contract, even if not prohibited by statute, would be held to be against
public policy, in that it tempted or encouraged the assured to commit
suicide in order to make provision for those dependent upon him or to
whom he was indebted.
Id.
54. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983) (rec-
ognizing that competent adult patient has legal right to refuse treatment); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (presuming that constitutional right to
privacy extends to patient's decision to terminate medical care).
55. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1989) (discuss-
ing balancing test for liberty interest in refusing medical care). Writing for the
majority in Cruzan, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the balancing test
promulgated in Quinlan:
Recognizing that this right [of privacy] was not absolute, however, the
court balanced it against asserted state interests. Noting that the State's
interest "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily
invasion increases and the prognosis dims," the court concluded that the state in-
terests had to give way in that case.
Id. at 270 (quoting Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664) (emphasis added).
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B. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
Most states prohibit assisted suicide for a variety of reasons. 56
The first reason is to protect persons from the influence of the ac-
56. SeeALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a) (2) (Michie 1995) ("A person commits the
crime of manslaughter if the person intentionally aids another person to commit
suicide."); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) ("A
person commits manslaughter by... intentionally aiding another to commit sui-
cide."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a) (2) (Michie 1993) ("A person commits man-
slaughter if... [h] e purposely causes or aids another person to commit suicide.");
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988) ("Every person who deliberately aids, or ad-
vises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony."); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 18-3-104 (1990) ("A person commits the crime of manslaughter if... [h]e
intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide."); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53a-56 (West 1994) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree when: he intentionally causes or aids another person, other than by force,
duress or deception, to commit suicide."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1995) ("A
person is guilty of promoting suicide [a class F felony] when the person intention-
ally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, or when he intentionally aids
another person to commit suicide."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992) ("Every
person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be
guilty of manslaughter."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1993) ("A person
commits the offense of manslaughter if ... [h]e intentionally causes another per-
son to commit suicide."); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-1-2 (West 1986) ("A person who
intentionally causes another human being, by force, duress, or deception, to com-
mit suicide commits causing suicide, a Class B felony."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406
(1995) ("Assisting suicide is intentionally advising, encouraging or assisting an-
other in the taking of the other's life which results in a suicide or attempted sui-
cide ... [and] is a severity level 9, person felony."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 204(1) (West 1983) ("A person is guilty of aiding or soliciting suicide [a class D
crime] if he intentionally aids or solicits another to commit suicide and the other
commits or attempts suicide."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987) ("Who-
ever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the other's own
life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years [or 7 years for
attempt suicide]."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994) ("A person who willfully, or
in any manner, advises, encourages, abets, or assists another person to take, or in
taking, the latter's life, or in attempting to take the latter's life, is guilty of felony
..... "); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023 (West 1996) ("A person commits the crime of
voluntary manslaughter if [h]e knowingly assists another in the commission of self-
murder."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995) ("A person who purposely aids or
solicits another to commit suicide, but such suicide does not occur, commits the
offense of aiding or soliciting suicide."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-307 (1995) ("A per-
son commits assisting suicide [a class IV felony] when, with intent to assist another
person in committing suicide, he aids and abets him in committing or attempting
to commit suicide."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1996) ("A person is guilty of
causing or aiding suicide [a class B felony] if he purposely aids or solicits another
to commit suicide."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995) ("A person who pur-
posely aids another to commit suicide is guilty of a crime of the second degree if
his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-
4 (Michie 1996) ("Whoever commits assisting suicide is guilty of a fourth degree
felony."); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15 (Consol. 1984) ("A person is guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree when ... [h]e intentionally causes or aids another
person to commit suicide."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (Consol. 1984) ("A person is
guilty of promoting a suicide attempt [a class E felony] when he intentionally
causes or aids another person to attempt suicide."); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (Con-
sol. 1984) ("A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when . .. [t]he
15
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cessory who, for selfish motives, could improperly and expeditiously
lead a weak-minded, vulnerable person to self-destruction. At com-
mon law, one who was present and assisted in a suicide was consid-
ered an accessory before the fact. This was an offense tantamount
to murder and manslaughter because such influence and assistance
helped to cause the death of another.5 7 The second reason is one
defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or
deception, another person to commit suicide."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04
(Supp. 1995) ("(1) Any person who intentionally or knowingly aids, abets, facili-
tates, solicits, or incites another person to commit suicide, or who provides to,
delivers to, procures for, prescribes for another person any drug or instrument
with knowledge that the other person intends to attempt to commit suicide with
the drug or instrument is guilty of a class C felony. (2) Any person who, through
deception, coercion, or duress, willfully causes the death of another person by sui-
cide is guilty of a class AA felony."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 (West 1983)
("Every person who willfully, in any manner, advises, encourages, abets, or assists
another person in taking his own life, is guilty of aiding suicide."); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 815 (West 1983) ("Every person who willfully aids another in at-
tempting to take his own life ... is guilty of aiding an attempt at suicide."); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (West 1983) ("A person who intentionally aids or solicits
another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct
causes such suicide or an attempted suicide."); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4009
(1983) ("Every person who deliberately permits, aids, advises, encourages, or co-
erces another to commit suicide ... shall be punished by imprisonment."); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (Michie 1988) ("Any person who intentionally in any
manner advises, encourages, abets or assists another in taking his own life is guilty
of a class 6 felony."); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1994) ("A person com-
mits an offense if, with intent to promote or assist the commission of suicide by
another, he aids or attempts to aid the other to commit or attempt to commit
suicide."); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2141 (1996) ("Whoever deliberately aids, ad-
vises or encourages another to commit suicide shall be imprisoned for not more
than 5 years."); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) ("A person is
guilty of promoting a suicide attempt [a class C felony] when he knowingly causes
or aids another person to attempt suicide."); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1996)
("Whoever with intent that another take his or her own life assists such person to
commit suicide is guilty of a Class D felony.").
Minnesota does, however, exempt health care providers from liability under
its criminal statute by stating:
A health care provider . . . who administers, prescribes, or dispenses
medications or procedures to relieve another person's pain or discom-
fort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the risk
of death, does not violate this section unless the medications or proce-
dures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause
death.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215, Subd. 3(a) (West Supp. 1996). Additionally, the
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W. 2d 714 (Mich. 1994),
held that assisted suicide is a common law felony. Id. at 716.
57. See Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 162-63 (1872) (holding that act of
assisting in another's suicide constitutes murder). Historically, some states refused
to call assisted suicide a distinct crime; instead, the acts of encouraging a suicide
constituted murder. The Supreme Courts of Ohio, Illinois and Michigan acknowl-
edged that suicide was not a crime, but providing poison to another with the intent
that it would cause death constituted murder.
In Blackburn, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[i]t is immaterial whether
the party taking the poison took it willingly, intending thereby to commit suicide,
678
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who assists in a suicide is not necessarily mentally ill or despondent
and arguably, does not share the same claim to compassion and
pity. The final reason is that at common law there is a general duty
to rescue imposed on one who places another at peril.58 The acces-
sory in a suicide has that general duty to rescue due to his or her
role in placing the person at risk.5 9
or was overcome by force, or overreached by fraud." Id. The Blackburn court
stated that "the real criminal act being charged here is not suicide, but administer-
ing poison." Id. at 163-64. Additionally, the Blackburn court stated that killing an-
other person is "murder ... irrespective of the wishes or the condition of the party
to whom the poison is administered, or the manner in which, or the means by
which, it is administered." Id. at 163.
In People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920), overruled in part by People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995),
the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Blackburn. Id. at 693. In
explaining its interpretation of the Blackburn rationale, the Roberts court stated:
Where one person advises, aids, or abets another to commit suicide, and
the other by reason thereof kills himself, and the adviser is present when
he does so, he is guilty of murder as a principal, or in some jurisdictions
of manslaughter .... But if the one who encourages another to commit
suicide is not present when the act is done, he is an accessory before the
fact and at common law escapes punishment because his principal cannot
be first tried and convicted. The abolition of the distinction between aid-
ers and accessories in some jurisdictions has, however, carried away this
distinction, so that a person may now be convicted of murder for advising
a suicide, whether absent or present at the time it is committed, provided
the suicide is the result of his advice.
Id. (citations omitted).
In 1994, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled, in part, the holding of Rob-
erts. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 716. In a memorandum opinion, the court held that
common law murder did not include "providing the means by which a person
commits suicide." Id. The court emphasized, however, that an individual could be
charged with murder if "there is probable cause to believe that death was the di-
rect and natural result of a defendant's act .... Id. The court further stated that
the Michigan court could still charge a person providing the means to a suicide
with "a common-law felony." Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court also adopted the rationale of Blackburn. See Bur-
nett v. People, 68 N.E. 505, 510-11 (Ill. 1903) (determining that if person aids,
encourages or induces individual to commit suicide then person may be found
guilty of murder). The Burnett court held that the "acts of the principal are the
acts of the accessory, and that the latter may be charged with having done the acts
himself," regardless of whether crime was committed by the principal. Id. at 511.
58. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 90 (2d ed. 1995)
(recognizing that "a person who wrongfully, or perhaps innocently, harms another
or another's property, or who places a person or her property in risk of harm, has
a common law duty to aid the injured or endangered party.... A duty to act may
arise from non-culpable risk-creation").
59. See, e.g., BETZOLD, supra note 11, at 251 (stating that prosecutor in Kevor-
kian trial argued that "the law imposes a duty to save a drowning man if you
pushed him in"). During the prosecution of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, Macomb County
Prosecutor Carl Marlinga stressed that Kevorkian had a duty to stop the suicides
because he helped place the people in the suicidal position. Id.
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Efforts to legitimize assisted suicide and euthanasia were initi-
ated in Europe and America before World War 11.60 Although un-
successful, the "Voluntary Euthanasia Bill" introduced in England
in 1936 foreshadowed many of the current physician assisted sui-
cide proposals.6' This bill provided two primary safeguards against
abuse. First, it required the opinions of two medical personnel to
certify the patient's medical status. 62 Second, it provided for a "Eu-
thanasia Referee" who would interview the patient and, if satisfied
that the patient was rational, issue a "medical certificate."6 3 Reports
of Nazi medical experimentations, conducted in the name of eutha-
nasia, however, surfaced during World War II. Subsequently, the
English bill was defeated and support for assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia diminished in not only Europe but also the United States.M
In America, unsuccessful efforts to allow euthanasia began dur-
ing the 1930s, specifically in Nebraska and New York.65 In subse-
60. See ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 265-68 (discussing history of eutha-
nasia in England and United States); see also Messinger, supra note 21, at 191-92
(noting efforts in Great Britain and United States to enact legislation allowing for
euthanasia); Schanker, supra note 11, at 998-99 (discussing legislative attempts to
legitimize euthanasia in United States and Europe).
61. See ST. JOHN-STEvAs, supra note 26, at 267-68 (discussing England's Volun-
tary Euthanasia Bill); see also RICHLA RD SHERLOCK, PRESERVING LIFE: PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE LIFE NOT WORTH LIVING 119-20 (1987) (noting early, unsuccessful at-
tempts to pass euthanasia legislation in United States and England).
62. See ST. JOHN-STEvAS, supra note 26, at 267 ("A formal application is to be
signed by the patient in the presence of two witnesses.., together with two medi-
cal certificates, one from the attendant doctor and the other from a specially quali-
fied practitioner."). A similar bill, supported by the Euthanasia Society of America,
required court participation. See id. (stating that bill "provide [d] for application to
the courts for a certificate, the courts being empowered to appoint a committee of
physicians and others to investigate the case" (footnote omitted)).
63. See id. (stating that referee was to perform "a personal interview... and
establish that he fully understands what is being done").
64. See id. at 265 (describing Nazi atrocities and effects upon euthanasia
movement); Schanker, supra note 11, at 999 n.136 (explaining that Nazi practices
caused New York legislature to reject euthanasia bill). Prior to World War II, com-
pulsory euthanasia of the old and terminally ill was advocated by some. ST. JOHN-
STEVAS, supra note 26, at 265. During the war, however, the Nazis ordered the
deaths of 275,000 people through euthanasia. Id. Additionally, the Nazis sup-
ported their actions by mathematically comparing "the cost of caring for the dis-
abled with the cost of building new housing units or marriage allowance loans for
newly married couples." Schanker, supra note 11, at 999 n.136. See generally Yale
Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 36 L. QUADRANGLE 29
(1993) (opposing euthanasia and physician assisted suicide and citing to abuses
exhibited by Nazi practices).
65. See ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 266 (noting legislative attempt to
legitimate euthanasia in Nebraska and New York). In 1938, the Reverend Charles
Potter founded a euthanasia society. Id. The group adopted the English Bill as a
model. Id. In the same year, a bill was introduced into the Nebraska legislature.
Messinger, supra note 21, at 191. The legislature, however, never took action on
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quent years, most other states retained their prohibition against
assisted suicide, but reduced the offense to manslaughter or to
some lesser penalty where unbearable diseases were involved.66 De-
spite the lesser penalties, euthanasia activists were not satisfied with
this mere sentence mitigation. 67 In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
unsuccessful efforts to authorize euthanasia reappeared in Idaho,
Oregon and Montana.68 Several maverick doctors and spouses of
the terminally ill began to embark on missions to assist in the
"deaths" of comatose patients, who lingered indefinitely on life sup-
port systems.69 Finally, in 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court al-
lowed for the withdrawal of life support measures from a comatose
patient in the landmark case of In re Quinlan.7° While the Quinlan
court did not discuss the question of euthanasia, it relied instead on
the individual's right in choosing to disallow invasive medical pro-
cedures that prolong life.7 1 Following the Quinlan case, the United
States Supreme Court also recognized a similar liberty interest in
the bill. Id. at 192 n.166. In 1939, a bill also similar to the English Bill, was pro-
posed but was never introduced into the New York legislature. Id. at 192.
66. For a detailed analysis of the laws of the various states that have prohibi-
tions against assisted suicides, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. Schanker, supra note 11, at 1000.
68. See Messinger, supra note 21, at 200 (summarizing unsuccessful bills intro-
duced in Florida, Montana, Oregon, West Virginia, Wisconsin, New York and
Idaho). For instance, "[i]n 1969, the Health and Welfare Committee of the Idaho
House of Representatives introduced a Voluntary Euthanasia Bill to legalize volun-
tary euthanasia 'when the patient is suffering from an irremediable condition."' Id.
(quoting 0. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF EUTHA-
NASIA 53-214 (rev. ed. 1977)).
69. See STJOHN-STEVAS, supra note 26, at 268-69 (citing Dr. Glanville Williams,
Mercy Killing Legislation-A Reply, 43 MIN. L. REv. 1, 1-12, (1958); Dr. W.R. Mat-
thews, Address at the Voluntary Euthanasia Society Annual Meeting (May 2, 1950).
70. 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976). In Quinlan, Karen Quinlan stopped
breathing for fifteen minutes. Id. at 654. A doctor concluded that she suffered
from a lack of oxygen to the brain. Id. She existed in a "chronic persistent vegeta-
tive state." Id.
71. See id. at 663 (finding that right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass
a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances").
In Quinlan, the court balanced the interests of the State against Quinlan's right of
privacy. See id. at 663-64 (comparing state's interest in protecting human life
against individual's privacy right). The court determined that the "State's interest
weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily inva-
sions increases and the prognosis dims." Id. at 664. The court also held that at
some point the individual's right becomes superior to the state's interest. Id. De-
spite this language, the court did not find "an absolute or general 'right to die."'
Kamisar, supra note 64, at 30. On the contrary, the court observed that there is a
difference between committing suicide and removing life support or refusing sur-
gery. See Quinlan, 335 A.2d at 665 (emphasizing "a real distinction between com-
mitting the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against life
support or radical surgery").
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Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.72 These two cases
helped to trigger the modern proliferation of living wills, 73 which
allow a person to indicate his or her choice concerning medical
care in cases of irremedial physical conditions.74
In 1980, the Hemlock Society was formed.75 Through educat-
ing people about the issue and raising the public's awareness, the
Society has sought to advocate and encourage the practice of eutha-
nasia, including physician assisted suicide. 76 By the time the Society
was formed, individual physicians had already become involved in
euthanasia by actively assisting their patients or loved-ones in com-
mitting suicide.77 These cases were rare and periodic, until Dr. Jack
Kevorkian made assisted suicide a cause c6lMbre by assisting in sev-
eral dozen suicides during the 1980s and 1990s. 78 Assisted suicide
is now part of a national debate. While several states have con-
ducted studies, assigned commissions and circulated referenda on
72. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). For a dis-
cussion of the facts and holding of Cruzan, see infra notes 113-16 and accompany-
ing text.
73. See Schanker, supra note 11, at 1000 ("After the 1976 Quinlan decision, the
development and proliferation of living wills statutes largely preempted the eutha-
nasia debate until the 1980s .... ").
74. For a discussion of living wills, see infra note 230 and accompanying text.
In 1990, Congress passed the Patient's Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, 104 Stat. 1388-115 to -117 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a) (1) (Q),
(f) (1994)). The Act requires that "a provider of services or prepaid or eligible
organization ... provide written information about.., an individual's rights under
State law [about] ... the right to formulate advance directives .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i). Advance directives include "written instruction[s], such as a
living will or durable power of attorney for health care .... " Id. § 1395cc(f) (3).
75. For a general discussion of the Hemlock Society, see DEREK HUMPHRY,
FINAL Exrr: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR
THE DYING (1991). Derek Humphry was the founder of the Hemlock Society and
wrote many books on euthanasia. In Final Exit, Humphry explored the variety of
ways one could commit suicide. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Schanker, supra note 11, at 986-91 (discussing unsuccessful prosecu-
tion of several physicians).
78. For a general discussion of Dr. Kevorkian, see BETZOLD, supra note 11, at
7-37. By October 1996, Kevorkian had assisted in approximately 42 suicides. Kevor-
kian Present at MS Patient's Suicide, THE RECORD, Oct. 11, 1996, at A23. The number
of assisted suicides that Jack Kevorkian participates in seems to change monthly.
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the issue of euthanasia, 79 the states have generally retained their
prohibitions against physician assisted suicide.80
79. See, e.g., New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is Sought-
Assisted Suicide in the Medical Context, in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 890-
91 (reporting of New York Task Force's rejection of legalizing assisted suicide). In
New York, a comprehensive study was conducted by a commission appointed by
Governor Mario Cuomo in 1985. The Task Force was composed of 24 members
representing a broad spectrum of ethical and religious views. In May 1994, the
Task Force finally issued its report. Id. at 890. While the members disagreed on
the legality and morality of physician assisted suicide, the members unanimously
agreed not to change New York law which banned assisted suicide. Id. The Task
Force believed "that the dangers of such a dramatic change in public policy would
far outweigh any possible benefits." Id. It concluded that legalizing assisted sui-
cide would be too dangerous to many patients. See id. (describing possible abuses
and problems that could occur if euthanasia was legalized).
In 1992, the Michigan legislature was in the process of appointing a blue-
ribbon commission when news broke that Dr. Jack Kevorkian had been involved in
yet another one of his highly publicized assisted suicides. The bill creating the
commission passed; however, a last minute amendment to the legislation made
assisting a suicide a criminal offense. See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges
to Bans on "Assisted Suicide". The View from Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 777-78 (1994) (discussing legislative efforts in Michigan in response to Dr.
Kevorkian's activities).
80. For a listing of the various state statutes banning assisted suicide, see supra
note 56 and accompanying text. Despite some states' continued prohibition
against assisted suicide, other states have attempted, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, to introduce pro-euthanasia legislation. See Schanker, supra note 11, at 1000-
03 (describing attempts of several states to enact legislation permitting euthana-
sia). Recently, Oregon presented its voters with Measure 16 which would exempt
physician assisted suicide from the definition of murder, among other things. The
ballot description of Measure 16 stated:
This measure would allow an informed and capable adult resident of
Oregon, who is terminally ill and within six months of death, to volunta-
rily request a prescription for medication to take his or her life. The
measure allows a physician to prescribe a lethal dose of medication when
conditions of the measure are met....
The process begins when the patient makes the request of his or her
physician, who shall:
* Determine if the patient is terminally ill, is capable of making health
care decisions, and has made the request voluntarily.
" Inform the patient of his or her diagnosis and prognosis; the risks and
results of taking the medication; and alternatives, including comfort
care, hospice care, and pain control ....
* Ask that the patient notify next of kin ....
" Refer the patient for counseling, if appropriate.
" Refer the patient to a consulting physician.
A consulting physician, who is qualified by specialty or experience,
must confirm the diagnosis and determine that the patient is capable and
acting voluntarily. If either physician believes that the patient might be
suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder, or from depression
causing impaired judgment, the physician must refer the patient to a li-
censed psychiatrist or psychologist for counseling. The psychiatrist or
psychologist must determine that the patient does not suffer from such a
disorder before medication may be prescribed....
At least fifteen days must pass from the time of the initial oral re-
quest and 48 hours must pass from the time of the written request before
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Prosecution for assisted suicide only works to reveal the contra-
diction inherent in its criminal complicity. Historically, an acces-
sory to an act was innocent unless the principal was convicted.8 ' If
the principal was acquitted or immune from prosecution, the ac-
complice was also acquitted or immune.82 Today, guilt of the prin-
cipal is unnecessary to convict the accessory, although there must
be some showing of the principal's involvement in the criminal of-
fense.83 In assisted suicide prosecutions, there is no guilty princi-
the prescription may be written. Before writing the prescription, the at-
tending physician must again verify the patient is making a voluntary and
informed request, and offer the patient the opportunity to rescind the
request .... Those who comply with the requirements of the measure are
protected from prosecution and professional discipline .... The measure
does not authorize lethal injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia.
Actions taken in accordance with this measure shall not constitute sui-
cide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law.
Measure 16, in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, § 6.6, at 888 (alterations in
original). In November 1994, Measure 16 passed with 51% of the vote. Measure 16
History, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 6, 1995, at A6. On December 7, 1994, how-
ever, the day before the law was to take effect, Judge Michael Hogan placed an
injunction on its enforcement. Id. In August 1995, Judge Hogan held that Mea-
sure 16 was unconstitutional. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1438 (D. Or.
1995). The court determined that the Measure violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1437. Specifically, the court
agreed with the plaintiffs that Measure 16 does not provide adequate safeguards
against individuals wrongly choosing suicide. Id. at 1434-37 (noting lack of medi-
cal safeguards monitoring and preventing improper decisions of suicide). More-
over, the court found Measure 16 was irrational and unconstitutional because
"there is no set of facts under which it would be rational for terminally ill patients
under Measure 16 to receive a standard of care from their physicians under which
it did not matter whether they acted with adequate reasonableness . Id. at
1437.
81. SeeLAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 5, § 6.6, at 573 (discussing defense of legal
impossibility). The necessity of convicting the principal had tremendous
ramifications:
The most significant procedural limitation on conviction of an accessory
at common law was that conviction of the principal was an absolute pre-
requisite. An accessory could not be placed on trial in advance of the
principal, and this was so even if the principal was amenable to prosecu-
tion because he could not be apprehended or had died.
Id. (footnote omitted).
82. See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 107 (noting that Circuit Judge
David Breck dismissed murder charge against Dr. Kevorkian in death of Marjorie
Wantz, ruling "[c] ommon logic dictates that if suicide is not a crime (and it is not,
in Michigan), then someone who assists should not be criminally responsible").
83. DRESSLER, supra note 58, at 445. It is still true that "a defendant may not
be convicted as an [accomplice] where the guilt of a principal has not been
shown." People v. Vaughn, 465 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Or, put
another way, logically, for an accomplice to be guilty of a crime, there must have
been a crime committed by another person from whom the accomplice's liability
originates.
684
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pal, because suicide and attempted suicide are legal.84 In a sense,
general complicity law has conflicted with the legislative prerogative
to ban assisted suicide.85 If the physician is not guided by improper
or selfish motives, a prosecution that singles out the physician for
criminal treatment lacks equitable symmetry. Moreover, if the phy-
sician has assented to the rational wishes of the patient, then the
physician merely intended to solemnize a legal act. There is a cer-
tain perverseness in the notion that a person can be charged with
the crime of aiding and abetting a lawful act.86
1. The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code reflects a conservative view towards the
prosecution of assisted suicide. Section 210.5 of the Code provides:
(1) Causing Suicide or Criminal Homicide. A person may
be convicted of criminal homicide for causing another to
commit suicide only if he purposely causes such suicide by
force, duress or deception.
(2) Aiding or Soliciting Suicide as an Independent Of-
fense. A person who purposely aids or solicits another to
commit suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if
his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide,
and otherwise of a misdemeanor.8 7
In addressing issues of causation and suicidal predisposition, the
Model Penal Code requires the showing of a greater causal link to
84. For a discussion of the legality of suicide and attempted suicide, see supra
notes 2-55 and accompanying text.
85. See Silving, supra note 6, at 371-76 (describing three types of statutes deal-
ing with aiders, instigators and abettors and their relationship in participating in
euthanasia).
86. See generally Geoffrey N. Fieger, The Persecution and Prosecution of Doctor
Death and His Mercy Machine, 20 OIo N.U. L. RFv. 659 (1994) (defending Dr.
Kevorkian's efforts in assisting suicide).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (1980). The drafters of the Model Penal
Code realized that:
[T]here is no form of criminal punishment that is acceptable for a com-
pleted suicide and that criminal punishment is singularly inefficacious to
deter attempts to commit suicide .... It seems preposterous to argue that
the visitation of criminal sanctions upon one who fails in the effort is
likely to inhibit persons from undertaking a serious attempt to take their
own lives. Moreover, it is clear that the intrusion of the criminal law into
such tragedies is an abuse. There is a certain moral extravagance in im-
posing criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own self-
destruction, who has not attempted direct injury to anyone else, and who
more properly requires medical or psychiatric attention.
Id. at cmt. 2.
1996]
23
Carter: Knight in the Duel with Death: Physician Assisted Suicide and the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANoVA LAW REVIEW
establish assistance than do many state court decisions. 88  The
Code also requires that the accessory either cause or force the sui-
cide, a stricter form of causation than that accepted in some of the
state cases.89 For example, one older decision established that plac-
ing poison before a suicidal person is murder.90 Under the Code,
placing poison before a suicidal person does not actually "cause"
the suicide as it is the suicidal person's predisposition and actions
that may account for the death. 91 The accessory often assents to
the active and relentless pressure created by the suicidal person's
desire to die.92 Thus, the Code may be interpreted to find that
assisting a rational, predisposed suicidal person would be legal, be-
cause the person's suicidal predisposition would sever the causal
chain. This interpretation of legality would also show that the
88. Id. § 210.5. Many states recognize that any act of assisting or encouraging
is sufficient for the offense of manslaughter or murder. See, e.g., State v. Marti, 290
N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1980) (holding assistance sufficient to constitute involun-
tary manslaughter where defendant gave suicidal person loaded gun in order to
commit suicide); Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1961)
(finding husband guilty of manslaughter after he taunted drunk, emotionally dis-
turbed, suicidal wife and assisted her in procuring and firing loaded gun).
89. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (stating person is guilty of criminal homi-
cide if he or she "purposely causes such suicide by force, duress, or deception" and
guilty of felony of second degree if he or she "causes such suicide or an attempted
suicide").
90. See People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920), overruled in part by Peo-
ple v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795
(1995) (holding that acting "purposefully and maliciously to kill a human being,
by administering ... poison is murder, irrespective of the wishes ... or the manner
in which, or the means by which, it is administered").
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (noting that conduct must cause suicide
or attempted suicide). Since 1920, there has not been a single defendant found
guilty of assisting in a suicide. See People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that defendants "have been found guilty of crimes
ranging from the equivalent of negligent homicide to voluntary manslaughter,"
instead of murder). Some courts require a heightened level of assistance to deter-
mine causation. For example, in Campbel1 the accessory placed a gun before the
decedent and encouraged the person to shoot himself. Id. at 28. In acquitting
the defendant, the court reasoned that the "[d]efendant had no present intention
to kill. He provided the weapon and departed. Defendant hoped Basnaw would
kill himself but hope alone is not the degree of intention requisite to a charge of
murder." Id. at 30. Additionally, the court found that two-thirds of the states do
not criminalize incitement to suicide and that incitement to suicide was never con-
sidered a crime under the common law. Id.; see also Marti, 290 N.W.2d at 579
(holding assistance only constituted involuntary manslaughter where defendant
gave individual loaded gun); Persampieri, 175 N.W.2d at 390 (holding husband
guilty of manslaughter despite providing gun to his wife with instruction on how to
pull trigger); State v. Bier, 591 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Mont. 1979) (affirming husband's
conviction for negligent homicide because he cocked gun that wife used in com-
mitting suicide).
92. For a discussion of cases where the accessory relents to the pressures of
the principal's wish to die, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
686 [Vol. 41: p. 663
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Code identifies with the ordeal of one suffering from a terminal
illness. For if the accessory to the suicide has acted not from mal-
ice, but from compassion and duress, a criminal charge would seem
unnecessarily harsh.
2. The Environment of Pain
One cannot understand the assisted suicide issue and the med-
ical necessity defense without understanding the personal suffering
caused by a painful, terminal disease.93 Legal abstractions do not
convey the ordeal of terminal affliction. Relatives and physicians
see the physical deterioration caused by incurable diseases at its
worst. For example, in cancer cases, the patients suffer "cachexia,"
which is characterized by insufficiency of the liver, chronic chemi-
cal imbalances and dangerous toxicity from chemotherapy and
other forms of treatment.94 While drugs are used in a preventative
fashion, they cannot eliminate extreme forms of suffering in some
cases.95 A certain percentage of lung cancer patients bleed to
death and literally drown in their own blood.96 Tumorous cancer
93. See SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE 100-05, 194-98, 213-19 (1994) (dis-
cussing painful ordeal of cancerous deaths, Alzheimer's disease and acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)); see also BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at
107 (discussing ordeal of suicides assisted by Jack Kevorkian).
94. See NULAND, supra note 93, at 217-19 (discussing cancer and its effects on
those afflicted with this disease). Cancer cells affect the body both directly and
indirectly. Id. at 217. Directly, cancer cells block tubular organs, prevent meta-
bolic processes, cause bleeding and alter delicate biochemical balances. Id. Indi-
rectly, cancer leads to nutritional depletion called "cancer cachexia." Id. Cachexia
"is characterized by weakness, poor appfetite, alterations in metabolism, and wast-
ing of muscle and other tissues." Id. Additionally, malnutrition limits the effective-
ness of the immune system, which inhibits the body's response to cancer growth.
Id. at 218. Finally, depletion of nutrients can give rise to other deadly conditions,
such as stroke, myocardial infarction or heart disease. Id. at 219.
95. See ROSENBLA-rr, supra note 11, at 186 (discussing painful ordeal of wo-
man who could not ease her terminal infliction with pain-killing drugs); see also
NULAND, supra note 93, at 217-19 (discussing pain suffered by cancer patients).
96. See ROSENBLATr, supra note 11, at 273 (recounting trial testimony of Yale
Medical School physician Dr. Raymond Yesner regarding violent deaths of lung
cancer patients). After performing thousands of autopsies on patients with cancer,
Dr. Yesner testified as to the physiological development of cancer and the associ-
ated pain:Q [Defense attorney Rosenblatt]: And based upon the rapid growth of
the adrenal tumors, what would be your prognosis for successful
treatment?
A [Dr. Yesner]: Zero.
Q: What is the danger of a violent death?
A: Well, a certain percentage of patients with lung cancer bleed to death,
a certain number-those who have brain metastases-have probably
the worst deaths because brain metastases are pretty horrible and pa-
tients can have convulsions, can have projectile vomiting, and there is
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cells invade the nerve sheath and fibers causing intense pain.97
Often, a metastasis occurs where a transplant of the primary malig-
nant tumor travels to another part of the body and renews the as-
sault.98 Additionally, patients are spared no indignity as they suffer
seizures, incontinence and stool-soaked beds.99
Like cancer, other diseases present a host of agonies. Amyo-
trophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), commonly called "Lou Gehrig's dis-
ease," has neither a known cause nor cure.1 00 ALS leads to a
always the possibility that this tumor might erode into an adjacent
large blood vessel. A lung tumor could erode into a large blood vessel
where the patient literally drowns in his or her own blood ....
Q: Doctor, what is it about the disease or process of cancer that makes it
so very painful?
A: It involves pain nerves. The tumor or the cancer cells actually invade
the pain nerves. Tumor cells actually invade the pain nerves. Tumor
cells will grow into the nerve sheath and into the pain fibres.
Id.
97. Id.; see also NULAND, supra note 93, 202-17 (discussing characteristics and
vitality of cancerous cells).
98. See NuLAND, supra note 93, at 216 (discussing meaning of metastasis). Nu-
land notes:
In modern times, this one word, metastasis, has come to articulate the
defining feature of malignancy-cancer is a neoplasm that has the poten-
tial to go beyond its home and travel to some other place. A metastasis is,
in effect, a transplant of a sample of the primary tumor to another struc-
ture or even a distant part of the body.
Cancer's ability to metastasize is both its hallmark and its most men-
acing characteristic. If a malignant tumor did not have the ability to
travel, surgeons would be able to cure all but those that involve vital struc-
tures, which cannot be removed without compromising life. In order to
travel, the tumor must erode through the wall of a blood vessel or lymph
channel, and then some of its cells must become detached and pass into
the flowing stream. Either individually or clumped into an embolus, the
cells are then carried to some other tissue, where they implant and grow.
Determined by the route of blood or lymph flow as well as other still-
unclear factors, various cancers have a predilection to be deposited in
certain specific organs. For example, a breast cancer is most likely to
metastasize to bone marrow, lungs, liver, and, of course, the lymph nodes
in the armpit, or axilla. A cancer of the prostate commonly travels to
bone. Bones, in fact, along with the liver and kidney, are the most com-
mon sites for metastatic deposits, regardless of the malignancy's organ of
origin.
Id.
99. See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 143, 169 (recounting problems
faced by terminally ill patients).
100. See id. at 226. Arnyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) can affect individuals
differently. See id. at 226-31 (recounting dieases's effects on two person stricken
with ALS). ALS is a "motor neuron ailment." Id. at 153. Victims of the disease
lose the ability to move and speak. Id. In its terminal phase, ALS is hideous. Pa-
tients require feeding tubes and respirators to survive. These patients may eventu-
ally choke on their own saliva while conscious due to their total loss of muscle
control. For a discussion of the sufferings of two ALS patients who were assisted in
their suicides by Dr. Kevorkian, see id. at 153-54, 226-31.
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cessation of all neurological functions.10 1 Persons afflicted with
ALS eventually have no muscular movement and cannot even eat;
they release inaudible mumbles because they are unable to speak,
choke on their own saliva and suffer extreme pain.'0 2 Similarly,
Alzheimer's disease is a progressive, physiological brain deteriora-
tion that causes dementia. 03 The nerves of the brain "degenerate
into a matted plaque of fibrous material," with very little prospect of
reversing such advanced deterioration. 10 4 Patients in the late stages
of Alzheimer's lose substantially all memory of their earlier lives
and cannot even recognize their closest relatives and friends. 0 5
They are often incontinent, frequently fall and usually sit idly in
their weakened condition. 0 6 Multiple sclerosis and acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) also present debilitating, termi-
nal illnesses with no effective medical cures.' 0 7 Additionally, these
101. BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 153.
102. Id.
103. See NuLAND, supra note 93, at 91 (discussing effects of Alzheimer's dis-
ease). Alzheimer's effects "higher functions, such as memory, learning and judg-
ment." Id. The disease is possibly caused by a decrease in not only the nerve-cell
population but also the chemical, acetylcholine, which is used by the body to trans-
mit messages between nerve-cells. Id. Much, however, is still not known about the
disease. See id. ("Many of the details of the pathophysiology of the disease still
elude the most determined efforts of medical science.").
104. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVDUAL FREEDOM 218-19 (1994). Studies on the number of
Americans suffering from the disease are staggering:
In 1990, the Alzheimer's Association estimated that four million Ameri-
cans had the disease, and as Alzheimer's is a disease of the elderly, the
number is expected to increase as the population continues to age. In
1989, a Harvard Medical School study estimated that 11.3 percent of the
American population sixty-five or over probably had Alzheimer's. The
estimated prevalence increased sharply with age: 16.4 percent of people
between seventy-five and eighty-five. (Other studies, using a narrower
definition of the disease, suggest a significantly lesser but still alarming
prevalence.)
Id. at 219 (footnote omitted); see also NULAND, supra note 93, at 103 (describing
potential impact of disease in future years).
105. See DWORUuN, supra note 104, at 218 (describing effects of Alzheimer's
disease on stricken individuals).
106. Id.
107. See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 65-66 (recounting how individual
with multiple sclerosis lost use of arms, legs and neck muscles). Multiple sclerosis
affects the nerve coverings over the brain and spinal cord. Id. at 111. The disease
causes these coverings to deteriorate. Id. Effects of the disease can include,
among other things, the inability to walk, write own's name or go to the bathroom.
Id. at 113. Most individuals with multiple sclerosis, however, do not die from the
disease. See id. at 111 (noting that "less than five percent die from the disease").
Like multiple sclerosis, AIDS also brings about numerous painful and debilitating
conditions. Unlike multiple sclerosis, AIDS is a terminal disease and a frequent
killer. See NULAND, supra note 93, at 172 (noting that, in Northeast United States,
AIDS is leading cause of death among men between the ages of 25 and 45). More-
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diseases cause a loss of personal control and dignity, the destruc-
tion of one's sense of security and normalcy, the painful awareness
of one's former physical powers and present incapacities, and the
unwanted intrusion of machines, needles and medical
personnel. 108
The dying experience horror, fear and pain as such debilitat-
ing diseases destroy both their physical and mental conditions.
These lessons of despair and agony instruct each new generation
about such a deplorable existence. Thus, many may view physician
assisted suicide as a way to circumvent this personal and unnecessa-
rily painful tragedy. Generally, preserving one's life is an instinctive
and morally obliged act; however, to some, the more sensible and
courageous act would be to prematurely terminate their lives.
C. Status of the Law
1. The Active-Passive Distinction
"Thou shalt not kill, but need'st not strive [o]fficiously to
keep alive. "109
The active-passive distinction is the barometer that measures
the legality of assisted suicide.110 "Active" assisted suicide, which is
illegal, is the act of a physician affirmatively placing some instru-
ment, drug or gas before the patient, who then elects to complete
over, the national suicide rate of men with AIDS is significantly greater than
among men of a corresponding age who do not have the disease. See Peter M.
Marzuk et al., Increased Risk of Suicide in Persons with AIDS, 259JAMA 1333, 1335-37
(1988) (finding, for example, that suicide rate of men between ages of 20 to 59 was
36.30 times greater than for men of similar age in general population); see also
Timothy R. Cote et al., Risk of Suicide Among Persons with AIDS: A National Assess-
ment, 268 JAMA 2066, 2067-68 (1992) (discussing prevalence of suicide among
people diagnosed with AIDS). The devastating prognosis of pain and debilitation
in a disease that currently lacks a cure may explain such an increase in the inci-
dence of suicide among AIDS sufferers.
108. See generally ELISABETH KOBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969) (illus-
trating sequence of responses to diagnosis of terminal illness and identifying sev-
eral stages of pre-death assault: denial and isolation, anger, bargaining and hope,
depression, and acceptance).
109. A.R. Clough, The Latest Decalogue (satirical poem), cited in N. Ann Davis,
The Priority of Avoiding Harm, in KILLING AND LETrING DIE, supra note 4, at 299.
110. See N. Ann Davis, The Priority of Avoiding Harm, in KILLING AND LETTING
DIE, supra note 4, at 299-301 (discussing moral significance between acts and omis-
sions in assisted suicide). Proponents of passive euthanasia believe that "to act and
to thereby bring about a bad outcome is to harm, while to omit an act.., is merely
to fail to benefit." Id. at 300. In one of the assisted suicide prosecutions against
Dr.Jack Kevorkian in Michigan, however, CircuitJudge David Breck noted, in dis-
missing a first degree murder charge: "The distinction between assisted suicide
and the withdrawal of life support is a distinction without merit." BROVINS &
OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 107.
690 [Vol. 41: p. 663
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the act of suicide.' "Passive" euthanasia, which is legal, is exempli-
fied by a physician withdrawing life support treatment from a pa-
tient who chooses to die." 2 The leading authority establishing a
right to withdraw life support treatment is Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health." 8 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court allowed
a third party to testify that a comatose patient had previously made
statements suggesting that she rejected continued life support.11 4
Although the Court held that this testimony did not adequately ex-
press the patient's intent, Cruzan now stands for the proposition
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest of being
able to refuse invasive and undesired medical treatment.11 5 The
111. Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 793.
112. Id. Other commentators note that the proper terms of art no longer
include "passive euthanasia"; instead, "assisted suicide" is used to describe a physi-
cian's actions in providing the necessary means or information used by the person
committing suicide. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Decisions Near
the End of Life, 276 JAMA 2229, 2229 (1992). Conversely, "euthanasia" describes
the situation when the physician "performs the immediate life-ending action." Id.
113. 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court assumed that "the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279. Although the Court
questioned an incompetent person's ability to make an informed and voluntary
choice, the Court nonetheless also extended this right to incompetent persons. See
id. ("Such a 'right' must be exercised by her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.").
The Court, however, did not discuss whether a state must follow the decision of a
surrogate. See id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that Court did
not "decide issue whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surro-
gate decisionmaker"). More importantly, the Court refused to extend fundamen-
tal interest status to the right to refuse life-saving treatment. See id. at 279 n.7
(recognizing only liberty interest). In refusing to find a fundamental right, the
Court stated: "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treat-
ment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest." Id.
114. Id. at 284. In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was left in a persistent vegetative
state following an automobile accident. Id. at 266. Because this condition was
permanent, Nancy's parents sought the stoppage of life-sustaining measures. Id. at
267. The Court held that "a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydra-
tion of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state." Id. at 284. In
reaching its decision, the Court found that Missouri had a legitimate interest in
the preservation of human life. Id. at 280. Additionally, the Court stated that the
State had an interest in protecting an incompetent individual against potential
abuses by an unsympathetic or partial surrogate decision-maker. Id. at 281. The
Court rationalized that the risk of error from the higher standard of "clear and
convincing" evidence was proper because "[a]n erroneous decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment ... is not susceptible of correction." Id. at 283. Although
the Court acknowledged that Nancy Cruzan made statements suggesting that she
did not want to live in a vegetive state, the Court agreed with the Supreme Court of
Missouri that this evidence "did not amount to clear and convincing proof of
[Cruzan's] desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn." Id. at 285.
115. Id. at 278-79. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority, noted
that, "for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution
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interest recognized by Cruzan would allow one to refuse medical
treatment and passively die, not to actively intervene to hasten
one's death. In concurring, Justice Scalia identified the absurdity
of the active-passive distinction:
It would not make much sense to say that one may
not kill oneself by walking into the sea, but may sit on the
beach until submerged by the incoming tide; or that one
may not intentionally lock oneself into a cold storage
locker, but may refrain from coming indoors when the
temperature drops below freezing.' 16
In a literary analogy, Shakespeare also ridicules such active-pas-
sive distinctions of suicide. In Hamlet, a gravedigger explains the
legal effect of Ophelia's suicide, for if she killed herself, she was not
entitled to a Christian burial:
"Here lies the water-good. Here stands the man-good.
If the man go to this water and drown himself, it is, will he,
nill he, he goes. Mark you that. But if the water come to
him and drown him, he drowns not himself, argal he that
is not guilty of his own death shortens not his own life."
After hearing such a tortuous explanation, the other
gravedigger can only shake his confused and doubting
head and ask, "But is this law?"'17
The active-passive distinction is unacceptable, as the intent of
the actor is the same in both cases." 8 The physician who either
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesav-
ing hydration and nutrition." Id. at 279. In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor added that "a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions ... and that the refusal of
artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest."
Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 296 (ScaliaJ., concurring). AlthoughJustice Scalia acknowledged
that there was a distinction between active and passive suicide and that this should
have a bearing upon suicide legislation, he felt it was "unreasonable to draw the
line precisely between action and inaction." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. KORNSTEIN, supra note 38, at 104 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF HAMLET act 5, sc.1). Kornstein explained that "Shakespeare's witty
mention of se offendendo, with the final question translated as, 'But could anything
so ridiculous be law?' underscores the jurisprudential hairsplitting." Id.
118. Michael Tooley, An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing Versus Letting Die, in
KILLING AND LETTING DIE, supra note 4, at 103-04. The illogic of such a distinction
may be shown by the hypothetical of the two sons. One of the sons put poison in
his father's drink while the other son silently watched his father drink the poison-
ous concoction. The first son actually killed his father; however, the other son's
intent and inaction should make him also culpable. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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disconnects a life-support system or fails to connect a life-support
system is engaged in conduct which causes the death of the pa-
tient. 19 The intent is the same. Moreover, a medical omission by a
physician is an affirmation, because the physician has a duty of care,
subject to civil and criminal liability.120 In addition, the line be-
tween the active-passive distinction is not always self-evident. 12 1
One has the right to refuse invasive medical procedures on one's
body and the reciprocal right to grant invasive and even experimen-
tal medical procedures on one's body. Whether one refuses or
grants bodily invasion, the linchpin is the patient's consent. 22
2. Desuetude and Estoppel
The question of how a physician might lawfully influence, en-
courage or induce a suicide remains unclear. 23 Some courts have
found causation with the least bit of encouragement or assistance,
while others have demanded a greater degree of physician partici-
pation.' 24 Euthanasia is a prevalent but surreptitious medical cus-
tom, which occurs primarily through the administration of
excessive morphine. 25 Criminal prosecutions are rare; their ab-
119. SeeJames Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in KILLING AND LETTING
DIE, supra note 4, at 112-17 (arguing that, while many accept active-passive distinc-
tion, "a strong case can be made against this doctrine").
120. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 33 (1987)
("[A] doctor who omits life preserving measures in a situation where such meas-
ures are demanded by professional norms risks civil and criminal liability despite
the passive nature of his conduct.").
121. Id. at 34. "The line between manipulation of medical equipment and
active administration of death" is usually blurred. Id. For example, when a doctor
administers pain-killing narcotics, it may happen to accelerate the death of the
terminal patient. Id. Thus, the physician's act has a "double effect," with pain
relief being the primary, intended consequence and accelerated death a secondary
consequence. Id. at 35.
122. See id. at 33-35 (discussing medical trends that recognize that medical
care should be "in accordance with dying patient's wishes"); see also Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (stating that competent
person has constitutional right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
123. See Schanker, supra note 11, at 985 (stating that, because active euthana-
sia is illegal in the United States, physicians who assist patient in committing sui-
cide may be prosecuted under homicide statutes or laws prohibiting assisted
suicide which exist in thirty-one states).
124. See id. at 985-87 (providing summary of cases in which physicians were
charged for assisting in suicide).
125. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 11, at 279 (noting that primary method of
euthanasia is accomplished through administering excessive morphine into suffer-
ing patient). For example, in the trial of Dr. Peter Rosier, the physician was
charged with murdering his wife. During cross-examination, Dr. Anthony Ian-
none, a professor of neurology at the Medical College of Ohio, admitted that the
use of morphine drips was a surreptitious manner in which doctors hastened the
death of the terminally ill:
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sence reflects a recognition of sympathy and absence of proof.126
The prosecution is aware of the practice and their consequent si-
lence on this custom admits to tacit consent of the act.' 27 The state
may be accused of "desuetude" in that the law has been nullified
through disuse and acquiescence, prompting reliance on the medi-
cal practice. 128 The Supreme Court recognized these principles in
Poe v. Ullman,12 9 when it held that an unenforced Connecticut anti-
contraceptive law could not be the basis of a legal controversy. The
Q [Defense Counsel Rosenblatt]: Would you not agree that in many
American hospitals today that frequently what happens with terminally
ill patients is that doctors secretly increase morphine drips or take
such other steps as may be necessary to hasten the patient's demise?
A [Dr. lannone]: I would agree with that; yes, it certainly has happened.
Q: It goes on all the time, doesn't it?
A: Yes.
Id.; see also id. at 19, 70-71, 182-83 (discussing how morphine and other respiratory
depressants are given by doctors to hasten death and not just to reduce pain).
126. See id. at 180 (contending euthanasia is prevalent, but unprosecuted
criminal offense). During the trial of Dr. Peter Rosier for the murder of his wife, a
Florida medical examiner testified on cross-examination that assisted suicide pros-
ecutions are a rare occurrence, even though suicides among the elderly are
commonplace:
Q [Defense Counsel Rosenblatt]: In your work, Dr. Graves, you have
seen hundreds of suicides. Isn't that correct?
A [Dr. Graves]: Yes sir.
Q: Yet you have never had occasion to investigate a charge brought by a
prosecutor against a person for assisting a suicide. Isn't that correct?
A: That is correct.
Q: In your work as a medical examiner you have learned that there are a
lot of suicides among the terminally ill. Isn't that correct?
A: There appear to be increasing numbers as our aging population in-
creases and more people develop terminal diseases. And I think this is
a nationwide if not universal phenomena-we see more and more sui-
cides among the elderly and particularly those who have terminal
disease.
Id.
127. See id. at 178 (stating that medical examiner had no jurisdiction to per-
form autopsy in case of natural home death confirmed by attending physician); see
also Schanker, supra note 11, at 985 (noting that few indictments have been re-
turned despite practice of active euthanasia by physicians). Recently Newton
County Prosecutor Greg Bridges agreed to drop assisted suicide charges against a
77 year-old husband and the 50 year-old son of a terminally ill woman who died in
December of 1995 under suspicious circumstances. Husband, Son off the Hook in
Assisted Suicide Case, AP, Cm. TRIB., § 1, at 20 (Dec. 26, 1996). Judge Tim Perigo
dismissed the charges against Bernard A. Howard of Garland, Texas. Id. Velma
Howard, 76, had Lou Gehrig's disease and was found dead on December 9, 1995
in a Joplin motel room. Id. She ingested sleeping medicine and alcohol and was
found with a bag over her head. Id.
128. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 449 (6th ed. 1990) (defining desuetude as
"disuse; cessation or discontinuance of use" and noting that it is "[a]pplied to ob-
solete practices and statutes").
129. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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Court dismissed the action for declaratory judgment, stating that a
policy of not carrying out a law was "'truer law than the dead words
of the written text."' 30 Like Poe, the state has ignored countless
incidents of physician assisted suicide, and a sudden prosecution
arouses the suspicion of a discriminatory and ad hoc approach to-
wards justice.13 1
As a consequence of a perceived indiscriminate prosecution,
juries have acquitted physicians on the basis of jury nullification,
which presents the disturbing anomaly that a jury can surrepti-
tiously disregard the law.' 32 By providing a medical necessity de-
fense, the jury can find a cohesive legal doctrine of exculpation
which has the derivative effect of provoking legal reform.
III. THE DEFENSES OF NECESSITY AND MEDICAL NECESSITY
A. Origins of the Necessity Defense
Historically, there was no single accepted definition of the ne-
cessity defense, which recognizes that one may violate the law to
avoid a greater evil.' 33 Biblical parables illustrate the principle that
one may at times violate the law to serve a higher purpose.1 34 In
the New Testament for instance, Jesus responds to criticism of acts
performed in violation of the Sabbath:
What man shall there be among you, who shall have
one sheep, and if it falls into a pit on the Sabbath, will he
not take hold of it, and lift it out? Of how much more
130. Id. at 502 (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning,
310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940)). The Court stated:
The undeviating policy of nullification by Connecticut of its anti-contra-
ceptive laws throughout all the long years that they have been on the
statute books bespeaks more than prosecutorial paralysis. What was said
in another context is relevant here. "Deeply embedded traditional ways
of carrying out state policy .. ."-or not carrying it out-"are often
tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text."
Id. (quoting Nashville, 310 U.S. at 369)).
131. See ROSENBLA-r, supra note 11, at 277, 349 (stating that medical examin-
ers see many suicides among terminally ill, however, no one is usually prosecuted
for these).
132. For a discussion of the phenomena of jury nullification, see supra note
11 and accompanying text.
133. See GEORGE E. Dix & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAw 718-32 (3d ed.
1987) (discussing necessity, duress and justification defenses).
134. See, e.g., Luke 6:1-10 (recounting parables by Jesus that teach of eating
sacred bread through necessity of hunger and of Jesus invoking necessity in order
to heal people on Sabbath).
1996] 695
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value is a man than a sheep! So then, it is lawful to do
good on the Sabbath. 135
The necessity defense found marginal acceptance in English
common law and was discussed in Regina v. Dudley & Stephens.'3 6
Although the court recognized the defense in this early landmark
case, it rejected the defense's application in this instance. 137 In Re-
gina, three sailors and a cabin boy found themselves adrift after be-
ing shipwrecked at sea.138 After days of starvation and dehydration,
two of the three sailors decided to kill the sickly boy. Afterward, all
three sailors ate his body.'3 9 Thereafter, the sailors were rescued
and subsequently charged with murder. 140 The sailors invoked a
necessity defense, claiming a numerical calculus that one sick life
should be sacrificed to save three. 14' The English court held that
such a killing was murder and refused to recognize a necessity de-
fense because such a defense would create a legal cloak for "unbri-
dled passion and atrocious crimes."1 42 The sailors were sentenced
to be executed but the sentence was later commuted by the
Crown. 143 Since then, English and American courts have accepted
the necessity defense.1 44 Approximately one-half of the states rec-
135. Matthew 12:11-13.
136. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
137. Id. at 288; DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 255 ("Some commentators have
suggested that Dudley & Stephens did not ... categorically reject the defense of
necessity in homicide prosecutions." (footnote omitted)).
138. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 274.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 274-75.
141. Id. at 277. The sailors claimed that they were under "the pressure of
necessity" when they killed the cabin boy. Id. The court stated that "[n]ecessity
will excuse an act which would otherwise be a crime." Id. The court also found
that the sailors were not acting in self-defense. Id. at 276.
142. Id. at 288. The court stated that if the necessity defense was adopted, it
would leave "to him who is to profit by it to determine the necessity which will
justify him in deliberately taking another's life to save his own." Id. at 287. The
court did acknowledge that on the facts of this case, the sailors were subjected to
awful suffering. Id. at 288. The court still found, however, that there was "no legal
justification for the homicide." 1d.
143. Id. Although originally sentenced to death, the Crown later commuted
the sentence to six months imprisonment. Id.
144. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 472-93,
514-15 (1994) (noting that Lord Hailsham distinguished Regina v. Dudley & Ste-
phens "as an authority on the availability of the supposed defence of necessity
rather than duress. But I must say frankly that, if we were to allow this appeal, we
should, I think, also have to say that Dudley & Stephens was bad law."); see also
LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 442 (noting that "most but not all of the modern
recodifications following the Model Penal Code [Sec. 3.02] contain a broader
choice-of-evils defense which is not limited to any particular source of danger");
Arnolds & Garland, supra note 18, at 291-92 (discussing necessity defense).
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ognize the necessity defense by statute, and the remaining states
accept the contours of the defense through case law.145
The Model Penal Code similarly recognizes the necessity de-
fense as a "choice of evils," in which the actor asserting the defense
must satisfy the following essential elements to claim the defense:
(1) the threatened injury must be worse than the legal violation;
(2) the law does not provide exceptions or defenses in the particu-
lar situation; (3) there must be no legislation that specifically for-
bids the necessity defense; and (4) the actor must not have
recklessly or negligently caused the predicament which necessitated
the breaking of the law. 146
145. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (Michie 1993) (recognizing necessity
defense in "choice of evil statute"); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702(1) (West
1990) (recognizing necessity defense in emergency situations to avoid imminent
public or private injury); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1995) (recognizing neces-
sity defense in "choice of evil statute"); HAw. REv. STAT. § 703-320 (1993) (same);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (Michie 1990) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (Mc-
Kinney 1987) (recognizing necessity defense in emergency situations to avoid im-
minent public or private injury). The State of New York recognizes the necessity
defense and illustrates a more specific choice of evils based on ordinary or honest
belief by providing that:
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining
justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute
an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
(1) Such conduct is required or authorized by law or by ajudicial decree,
or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his offi-
cial powers, duties or functions; or
(2) Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an im-
minent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a
situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and
which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence
and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by
the statute defining the offense in issue. The necessity and justifiability of
such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the
morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or
with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereun-
der. Whenever evidence relating to the defense ofjustification under this
subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of
law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established,
constitute a defense.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (emphasis added); see also DRESSLER, supra note 58, at 263
(noting that "approximately one-half of the states now statutorily recognize [neces-
sity] defense. Some of the statutes define 'necessity' in general terms; others are
more specific in their descriptions. In states without a statutory defense, the vague
contours of the common law apply.").
146. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985). Section 3.02 provides that:
(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil
to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged; and
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The necessity defense allows the actor to act as judge and jury
in fashioning a one-time exception to the law.147 The circum-
stances prompting the criminal violation must be immediate, over-
whelming and genuine. Typical cases of necessity include: the
destruction of property to prevent the spread of fire, violating the
speed laws to rush a spouse to a hospital, disposing of valuable
cargo to save a floundering vessel, and dispensing a drug without
the requisite prescription to alleviate grave distress in an emer-
gency.148  The necessity defense is restricted and does not apply to
acts of civil disobedience or protest, which are interpreted as popu-
list efforts to renounce or rescind political policy. 149 Political ques-
tions remain for legislative and electoral reform, and protestors
must subscribe to alternative avenues of social change, not to break-
ing the law. 150 While the necessity defense admits to the legitimacy
of the law, it dismisses the law's applicability to the unique factual
circumstances. 151 A successful necessity defense invokes significant
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense pro-
vides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation
involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed
does not otherwise plainly appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situa-
tion requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for
his conduct, the justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a
prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the
case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Id.
147. See generally Arnolds & Garland, supra note 18, at 294 (discussing excep-
tions to necessity defense).
148. See DRESSLER, supra note 144, at 475; see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 3.02 cmts., at 9-14 (ALI 1985) (discussing typical necessity de-
fense cases); LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 5, at 444 (same).
149. SeeSteven M. Bauer & PeterJ. Eckerstrom, The State Made MeDo It: Appli-
cability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1173, 1189-1200
(1987) (discussing general obstacles in using necessity defense in civil disobedi-
ence cases).
150. See Brent D. Wride, Comment, Political Protest and the Illinois Defense of
Necessity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1070, 1083 (1987) ("In a society based on democratic
decision making, this is how values are ranked-a protester cannot simply assert
that her view of what is best should trump the decision of the majority of elected
representatives."). Former physician Jack Kevorkian proclaimed, however, that
one has a duty to violate assisted suicide laws:
The first thing you do is check the morality of the law and, if it's immoral,
you disobey it. You pass any law against assisted suicide and euthanasia
and I will disobey it . . . because it is immoral medically. When the law
itself is intrinsically immoral, there is a greater duty to violate the law.
See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 140 (discussing immorality and law).
151. See Wride, supra note 150, at 1083 (noting that "where a protest is regis-
tered against a legally sanctioned activity... the balance of the harms must weigh
against the protester").
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policy implications, because it creates a precedent to violate the
law. It may also drive legislative reform to redress the situation that
caused the invocation of the necessity defense in the first place. 152
As previously illustrated, the immorality of suicide invites ex-
ceptions, such as insanity and the ravages of an incurable disease.
In the cases of a painful, incurable illness, suicide is coerced.153 For
those oppressed by such an illness, victimized by a debilitating dis-
ease, or in pain, death may be a release. If the patient's pain and
suffering is refractory to treatment, then the wish for suicide should
be considered compelling and defensible. 54 The defense of force
majeure155 is standard in Dutch euthanasia cases and represents the
idea that the patient's extreme and enduring pain forces the physi-
cian to assent to the patient's wishes to take extraordinary meas-
ures.156 Force majeure is specifically applicable to the Dutch
physician as mental duress or necessity from the compelling cir-
cumstances, but the defense has not yet achieved legal status in the
United States. An act of euthanasia is not murder in the Nether-
152. See, e.g., State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). In
Diana, the court noted the response of the Washington state legislature to United
States v. Randal4 104 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 1976),
which permitted the medical necessity defense where the defendant used mari-
juana to relieve the pain attributed to glaucoma. The Washington state legislature
consequently enacted the Controlled Substances Therapeutic Research Act, recog-
nizing the medicinal uses of marijuana to alleviate glaucoma and cancer. Diana,
604 P.2d at 1316-17; see also Martin R. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right
to Escape from Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL.
L. REv. 110, 139-45 (1975) (claiming successful invocation of necessity defense in-
spires prison reform).
153. See Suzanne Stern-Gillet, The Rhetoric of Suicide, in SUICIDE: RIGHT OR
WRONG?, supra note 4, at 93, 95-99 (analyzing theory of coercive suicide in light of
historical figures like Socrates, Jesus Christ and I.R.A. protestor Bobby Sands, who
went on hunger strike).
154. See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 144-67 (discussing how patients
facing sheer agony seek help to end their lives when there is no hope of medical
cure).
155. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 645 (6th ed. 1990) (defining force majeure as
"[ifn the law of insurance, superior or irresistible force"). Force majeure literally
means "superior force." It is also a "clause ... common in construction contracts
to protect the parties in the event that a part of the contract cannot be performed
due to causes which are outside of the control of the parties and could not be
avoided by exercise of due care." Id.
156. See Schanker, supra note 11, at 994 n.98 (stating that "the concept of force
majeure has historically been used to excuse defendants who broke the law under
coercion"); see also HENDIN, supra note 2, at 250-77 (1995) (discussing de facto
legislation in Netherlands regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide).
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lands, but is treated as a death attributed to nature's compelling
inequities. 157
B. Distinguishing Necessity and Duress
The defense of duress is often confused with the necessity de-
fense, and modem courts have minimized the distinction between
the two.158 The major difference is that duress occurs where the
source of the coercion is in the action of others, while necessity
covers situations where there are physical forces beyond the actor's
control.1 59 The theory of necessity holds that the defendant's free
will was properly exercised to achieve a greater good. Conversely,
the theory of duress holds that the defendant's free will was over-
come by another person.1 60 While necessity occurs when one
chooses the lesser of two evils,161 duress occurs when one is unable
to exercise a free choice. 162 To a significant extent, the defenses
157. HENDIN, supra note 2, at 250-77. "Most recently the Dutch have begun to
accept psychological distress as justification for assisted suicide or euthanasia
whether or not physical illness is present." Id. at 258.
158. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) ("Modern cases have
tended to blur the distinction between duress and necessity."). In Bailey, two fed-
eral prisoners were prosecuted for escaping custody. Id. at 396. Their defense was
duress and necessity. Id. at 397. The Court held that "where a criminal defendant
is charged with escape and claims that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory
of duress or necessity, he must proffer evidence of a bono fide effort to surrender
or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive
force." Id. at 415.
159. See id. at 409-10 (discussing historical common law distinction between
duress and necessity). An example of duress may be illustrated where: "A de-
stroyed a dike because B threatened to kill him if he did not, A would argue that
he acted under duress, whereas if A destroyed the dike in order to protect more
valuable property from flooding, A could claim a defense of necessity." Id. at 410.
160. See DRESSLER, supra note 58, at 274 (citing United States v. Contento-
Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984) (concerning necessity and duress defense to
drug possession charge); People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. 1977) (concerning
distinction of necessity and duress to prison escape case)).
161. See Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d at 695 (explaining necessity defense). The
court stated:
The defense of necessity is available when a person is faced with a choice
of two evils and must then decide whether to commit a crime or an alter-
native act that constitutes a greater evil.... Traditionally, in order for
the necessity defense to apply, the coercion must have had its source in
the physical forces of nature .... The theory of necessity is that the de-
fendant's free will was properly exercised to achieve the greater good ....
Id. (citations omitted).
162. Id. According to the court:
The duress defense was applicable when the defendant's acts were co-
erced by a human force.... It has been suggested that "the major differ-
ence between duress and necessity is that the former negates the
existence of the requisite mens rea for the crime in question, whereas
under the latter theory there is no actus reus."
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overlap with both recognizing a commonality of compulsion that
would force a suicide-assisting physician to violate the law. 163
If one accepts the paradox that one may be a criminal acces-
sory to the lawful act of suicide, then the derivative influences of
necessity and duress are material to the ultimate resolution of the
physician's guilt or innocence. The past failure of juries to convict
physicians in medically assisted suicide cases reflect more than
faulty or capricious judgment.'r It represents the adoption of a de
facto medical necessity defense and represents the factfinder's in-
tolerance of contradictory legal policies of punishing an obliging
physician who assists in the legal act of suicide.' 65
C. The Medical Necessity Defense
Medical necessity is a variation on the necessity defense be-
cause it incorporates medical judgments and amplifies one's liberty
interest in personal health matters. 166 Medical necessity requires
that the accused act under a reasonable belief, supported by medi-
cal evidence, that some action to disobey the law was necessary as
an emergency measure to avert an imminent injury. The harm
threatened is often less immediate than that required for the ordi-
nary necessity defense. Medical necessity cases introduce the conse-
quence of interest-balancing where individual decisions concerning
death and health supersede the state's interest in preserving a ter-
minal life. 167
Typical medical necessity cases concern violating drug laws to
alleviate the debilitating effects of terminal diseases. In Jenks v.
State,'68 the court found that the statute outlawing the possession
and cultivation of marijuana did not preclude a medical necessity
defense when no other treatment was available to ameliorate the
nausea and pain suffered by the defendants, who had contracted
Id. (quoting United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis
added).
163. Id. "[M]odern courts have tended to blur the distinction between duress
and necessity." Id.
164. For a discussion of jury nullification, see supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
165. For a discussion of defenses to medically assisted suicide cases, see supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
166. See Isenberg, supra note 12, at 297 (examining medical necessity
defense).
167. See id. (dicussing how interests to be balanced can be demonstrated by
medical testimony).
168. 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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AIDS. 169 Similarly, in State v. Diana,1 70 the court remanded the case
to give the accused the opportunity to demonstrate the beneficial
effect of marijuana to treat his multiple sclerosis symptoms. 1 71
Medical necessity amplifies individual viewpoints on personal
health care matters. 172 Often, the medical choices that run counter
to the law present difficult value judgments, but the right of bodily
autonomy is paramount and should supersede the interests of the
state when death nears.' 73 The physician must qualify for the ne-
cessity defense by satisfying critical elements in proving the reasona-
bleness of the physician's conduct. 174
IV. APPLYING THE MEDICAL NECESSITY FACTORS TO AN ASSISTED
SUICIDE PROSECUTION
A. Belief in Medical Emergency
Medical necessity recognizes that suicide is sometimes a rea-
sonable response to a debilitating, terminal illness.175 Peril is evi-
dent from the patient's medical state and the ineffectiveness of
conventional alternatives for treatment. The reasonableness of the
physician's belief in the patient's terminal condition can be verified
through diagnosis and second medical opinions.' 76 Moreover, the
physician must ascertain the patient's competence. Competency
exists if the patient has substantial capacity and fair opportunity to
169. Id. The defendants, a married couple, were convicted of cultivating ma-
rijuana and possessing drug paraphernalia. Id. at 677. While the defendants ad-
mitted to the crimes, they claimed that they needed the marijuana to relieve their
AIDS-related symptoms. Id. The court reversed the convictions and acquitted the
defendants, holding that the necessity "defense was recognized at common law
and that there was no clear legislative rejection of that defense." Id. at 678, 680.
170. 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
171. Id. at 1317. In remanding the case, the court stated that "[t]o support
the defendant's assertions that he reasonably believed his actions were necessary to
protect his health, corroborating medical testimony is required." Id. Further, in
making its decision, "the court must balance the defendant's interest in preserving
his health against the States's'interest in regulating the drug involved." Id.
172. Several cases adopt the defense of necessity in medicine. See, e.g., State v.
Bachman, 595 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1979); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1991); State v. Cole, 874 P.2d 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Diana,
604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (noting individual's right to protect
and preserve one's own health and body).
173. For a discussion of the right of bodily autonomy, see supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of applying the medical necessity defense to assisted sui-
cide, see infra notes 175-285, and accompanying text.
175. See Isenberg, supra note 12, at 273 (discussing medical necessity asjustifi-
cation for assisted suicide and defense to criminal liability in assisted suicide cases).
176. See Bachman, 595 P.2d at 287 (stating that defense of medical necessity
cannot be effective unless there is supportive medical testimony).
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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understand the pertinent facts relating to his or her medical condi-
tion. 177 The competency test focuses on the patient's capacity to
comprehend the situation, risks and alternatives. The patient must
knowingly and intelligently assess the dangers of his or her choice.
Thus, there must be the capacity for a "reasoned choice" and "ra-
tional understanding" of the medical proceedings. 178 Admittedly,
the association between mental illness and suicide is difficult to
gauge. Some contend that suicide is proof of mental imbalance or
lunacy. Others claim that suicide is the result of diminished capac-
ity or depression, while still others profess that some suicides are
rational. 179
Capacity to choose death may be rational, even though a per-
son may be medicated and depressed. In Godinez v. Moran,'80 the
Supreme Court determined that a defendant who committed mur-
der and then attempted suicide was competent to waive his right to
counsel and plead guilty to a capital offense, despite the fact that he
was being medicated at the time.' 8 ' Two psychiatrists testified at
the plea phase of the trial that the defendant was informed and
understood the nature of the proceedings against him, even
though he was depressed at the time.' 8 2 The defendant later ap-
pealed the resulting death sentence, but the Court held that the
177. See Glenn C. Graber, Mastering the Concept of Suicide, in SUICIDE: RIGHT OR
WRONG?, supra note 4, at 135, 13949 (discussing when suicide is rational choice for
individual who has incurable pain).
178. See id. (stating that "it is rationally justified to kill oneself when a reason-
able appraisal of the situation reveals that one is really better off dead"); see also
Richard B. Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, reprinted in SUICIDE: RIGHT
OR WRONG?, supra note 4, at 185, 193-96 (discussing when decision to commit sui-
cide is rational).
179. For a discussion of suicide as a rational choice for an individual, see
supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
180. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
181. Id. at 396-402 & n.2. In Godinez, the defendant entered a Las Vegas, Ne-
vada bar and fatally shot two people. Id. at 391. Nine days later, the defendant
shot his former wife before attempting to commit suicide. Id. While in the hospi-
tal, the defendant confessed to the three killings. Id. The defendant subsequently
pled guilty to the three counts of first degree murder. Id.
182. Id. at 392-93. The trial court required the defendant to be examined by
two psychiatrists. Id. After the psychiatrists evaluated the defendant, the defend-
ant appeared before the trial court and requested his attorneys be discharged so
he could plead guilty. Id. Based upon the psychiatrists' report, the trial court con-
cluded that the defendant was competent to waive counsel and plead guilty. Id.
"The trial court explicitly found that respondent was 'knowingly and intelligently'
waiving his rights to the assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas were 'freely
and voluntarily' given." Id. at 393 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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defendant had been competent to plead guilty, and in effect, volun-
teer for his own execution. 183
Competent medical choices rest on the disclosure and under-
standing of available alternatives regarding proposed therapy and
cures. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Cruzan, "[t] he pos-
sibility of a medical miracle is indeed part of the calculus, but it is a
part of the patient's calculus." 184 It is rational to want to avoid a
debilitating death and to expect no miraculous cures or spontane-
ous remissions.
B. Expert Medical Authority
The defense of medical necessity must be supported by medi-
cal evidence to substantiate the patient's peril and to establish that
no other means are available to alleviate the patient's pain.1 85 This
supporting medical evidence must establish three conditions: (1)
the person who committed suicide must have suffered from a termi-
nal disease; (2) no other reasonable alternatives existed; and (3)
the person who committed suicide was rational. 186 If these condi-
183. Id. at 392. The Court stated that the standards for determining compe-
tency for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel and standing trial are the
same. Id. at 399-400. Furthermore, the Court stated that in addition to proving a
defendant competent to plead guilty or stand trial, a trial court must be satisfied
"that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary." Id. at 400.
184. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 321 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan went on to state that "[ijf current research
suggests that some hope for cure or even moderate improvement is possible within
the lifespan projected, this is a factor that should be and would be accorded signifi-
cant weight in assessing what the patient himself would choose." Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
185. Robert L. Risley, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Individual's Right to Die, 20
Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 597, 604-05 (1993) (endorsing active euthanasia when patient is
terminally ill and recommending that such determination should be confirmed by
two physicians).
186. Many of the proposed "Death with Dignity" acts include all of the factors
encompassed in a medical necessity defense. See, e.g., Risley, supra note 185, at 619
(providing proposed California Death with Dignity Act). The California electorate
defeated the proposed Death with Dignity Act in November 1992, which sought to
legalize physician assisted suicide. Nancy W. Dickey, Euthanasia: A Concept Whose
Time Has Come?, ISSUES IN LAw AND MEDICINE, Mar. 22, 1993, at 521. Forty-six per-
cent voted in favor of the act while 54% voted against it. Id. A similar proposed act
was defeated in Washington in 1991. Id. In November 1994, Oregon became the
first state to legalize doctor assisted suicide by a 51% to 49% vote. William Carlsen,
When Patients Chose to Die, S.F. CHRON.,June 3, 1996, at Al. Prior to the enactment
of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, a federal judge deemed the Act unconstitu-
tional. Id. The Oregon State Attorney General and the Act's sponsors have ap-
pealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. David G. Savage, Northwest Effort on Right
to Die Faces High Court, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at Al. The Oregon law is much
more detailed than the earlier California and Washington models, including
"guidelines to make clear that the assisted suicide would be carefully limited and
that the patient, not the doctor, would be in control at all times." Id. Further-
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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tions are satisfied, then the decision to assist the suicide would ap-
pear reasonable and justified.
A nonphysician may also commit medically assisted suicide. A
spouse, a health care administrator, a relative or a minister may as-
sist a suicide and be entitled to the medical necessity defense if the
prerequisites of the defense are established. The assistance must
be predicated upon the wishes of the suicidal person, the existence
of a terminal illness and the availability of no other reasonable al-
ternatives. 18 7 Physician assisted suicide concerns the assistance of
the physician; medically assisted suicide concerns the assistance of
anyone who alleviates a medical condition. 18a The medical neces-
sity defense would conceivably encompass both. Conversely, if fu-
ture statutes carve a narrow exception allowing physician assisted
suicide, then all others may be preempted from raising the de-
fense. 189 Nonphysicians could not proclaim a medical necessity de-
fense, barring unusual circumstances, if methods were available
through the physician.
C. Imminent Harm to Another
The physician may defend the patient from imminent harm.
The necessity defense allows one to avoid an evil to oneself or to
another. 190 The requisite element of imminent harm is actually a
misnomer in the end-of-life cases, because the terminal condition is
permanent. Attempts to apply the imminent harm requirement to
medical cases are complicated by the nature of the disease at hand,
its stage of development and differing medical opinions concerning
appropriate treatment. 191 Although there may be some disagree-
ment in projecting the exact time of death, there can be no disa-
more, two physicians must certify that the patient is likely to die within six months,
then the physicians may prescribe death-inducing medicine. Id.
187. See generally Lisa Belkin, There's No Simple Suicide, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 50, 50
(Nov. 14, 1993) (discussing suicide patient who had only weeks to live, who desired
to commit suicide in absence of other reasonable alternative).
188. Id.
189. For example, the proposed California Death with Dignity Act provided
only "mentally competent terminally ill adults the legal right to voluntarily request
and receive physician aid-in-dying." Risley, supra note 185, app. B at 619 (emphasis
added). A physician was then defined as "a physician and surgeon licensed by the
Medical Board of California." Id.
190. SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (1980) ("Conduct which the actor be-
lieves to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable."
(emphasis added)).
191. See NULAND, supra note 93, at 222-62 (discussing various approaches in
two terminally ill cancer cases). Dr. Nuland recounted the story of Harvey Nuland,
a man afflicted with cancer of the bowel, and his slow decline prior to his ultimate
death. Id. at 224-33. Dr. Nuland then recounted the story of Robert DeMatteis,
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greement that the illness is terminal. 192 Without the requirement
of a terminal illness, one may be unable to separate out the dis-
abled, temporarily forlorned and depressed. Imminent harm is a
question for the jury and depends on the circumstances of each
case.
D. Reasonable Alternatives
Medical necessity is available if there is no reasonable alterna-
tive. Health care professionals have an ethical duty to provide opti-
mal palliative care to dying patients, but many physicians are
uninformed about the appropriate doses, frequency of doses and
alternate modalities of pain control for patients with severe chronic
pain.1 93 Physicians attempt to balance a patient's distress with psy-
chological stimulations of hope and drugs.1 94 Drugs are often with-
held, however, because physicians need some indicators of the level
of the patient's pain to make a proper diagnosis and treatment.195
Nearly all physicians agree that, in about ten percent of the termi-
nally ill cases, no drug can soothe extreme pain. 196 It is in these
cases where the physician may have met the exhaustion require-
ment because conventional medical alternatives are useless.
The most frequently mentioned alternative to physician as-
sisted suicide is hospice care. 197 "[H]ospice is known as a philoso-
who was afflicted with colon, cancer, and his chemotherapy treatments leading up
to his death. Id. at 234-41.
192. See Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicides Constitutional? I
Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 725, 728 (1995) (stating that "only thing that is
not certain is the precise time when death will occur ... there is no difficulty in
determining who is terminally ill"); see also Risley, supra note 185, app. B at 621
(defining terminal condition under proposed California Death with Dignity Act as
"incurable or irreversible condition which will, in the opinion of two certifying
physicians exercising reasonable medical judgment, result in death within six
months or less").
193. See Margaret A. Sommerville, The Song of Death: The Lyrics of Euthanasia, 9
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 13 (1993) (discussing conflict between two phy-
sicians, in which one prescribed Tylenol and other prescribed morphine to relieve
pain).
194. See Richard J. Nelson, Comment, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs:
"Giant Step for the Sick and Dying"', 77 GEo. L.J. 463, 466 (1988) (stating "terminally
ill patients ... have the right to the hope that a new drug will cure their diseases
prolong[ing] their lives").
195. See Kathleen Poole, A Useful Way to Diagnose Bladder Disorders, 47 RN 50,
51 (Aug. 1984) (stating items withheld usually include "pain medications and
drugs . . . because [they] might interfere with test results").
196. See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 166 (stating that "[p]ain is con-
trollable in 90 percent of patients with oral morphine").
197. See generally Warren L. Wheeler, Hospice Philosophy: An Alternative to As-
sisted Suicide, 20 OHio N.U. L. REv. 755, 755 (1993) (discussing hospice philosophy
and how hospice care's team approach to pain management may be alternative to
706 [Vol. 41: p. 663
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phy of care; a medically oriented team approach to managing the
pain and symptoms for individuals with a limited life expec-
tancy."198 All treatment is palliative1 99 and directed toward tran-
quility and comfort, while integrating the families and friends with
the life of the patient.200 Family members are instructed on meth-
ods to minimize the patient's distress: organize the house, adminis-
ter medications for pain and nausea, and accompany the patient
throughout the peculiarities of the disease.20' Hospice care is in its
infancy. 20 2 It is expensive and the quality of care and experience
differs among various programs. 203
There are other alternatives for the physician if the affliction
cannot be controlled by medication. Some alternatives offer con-
troversial results and have not withstood the test of law. For in-
stance, the principle of double effect allows the physician to
aggressively treat the patient's pain, even though the practical con-
sequences are death. 204 Patient refusal of hydration and nutrition
allows a terminally ill patient to refuse food and water and die in a
suicide). Modern day hospice philosophy is based upon these principles: open-
ness of mind, friendship of the heart and freedom of spirit to listen to patients "as
they search for the meaning of their own spirituality." Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. One commentator defines palliative treatment as the "treatment of
the symptoms of the disease and not the disease itself, there is no intent to cure,
instead there is emphasis on whole-person care." Id.
200. Id.; see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv.
375, 426 (1988) (stating "dying person is made as comfortable as possible, but
death, being inevitable is not naturally forestalled"); Schanker, supra note 11, at
1008 (stating hospice "is intended to meet the physical, social, physiological, and
spiritual needs of both the dying patient and family").
201. See NULAND, supra note 93, at 265 (describing hospice care as "ability to
manage the process of death, making it as tranquil as professional kindness
could"); Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking By Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB. L.
REv. 693, 699 (1994) ("[W]e cannot ameliorate the disease process, so we give
intensive attention and care to the person. We give each individual as much
choice and control as possible."); Schanker, supra note 11, at 1008 (stating hospice
"provides a caring response to many patients' fear of pain, of dying alone and of
the tyranny of medical technology").
202. See Chris Petiakos, Comfort Zone: Hospices Fill Medical, Emotional Needs of
Patient's Family, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, § 6, at 1 (stating that there are about
1,700 hospices in America as of 1995). The first hospice opened in the United
States in 1974. Id. Some credit the rapid growth of hospices in the last twenty
years to our society's "discomfort with a medical system that places most of its at-
tention on prolonging life rather than the patient's need for dignity and comfort."
Id.
203. Id. (quoting hospice director as saying "[n]ot every hospice is the
same"). With the medical reimbursement, the average daily cost for a hospice stay
is roughly $90. Id. Many insurance companies and managed care providers have
also extended their coverage to include hospice stay. Id.
204. See N. Ann Davis, The Priority of Avoiding Harm, in KILLING AND LETTING
DIE, supra note 4, at 298-354 (detailing doctrine of double effect).
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benign fashion. 205 The physician's choices are limited if pain can-
not be remedied. Otherwise, the patient must suffer through the
ordeal. Whether the proposed alternatives are reasonable is a ques-
tion for the jury, but each of the previously mentioned recommen-
dations pose social and legal difficulties which are unresolved.
E. No Fault, No Legislation
One cannot assert a medical necessity defense if one created
the crisis.206 In the case of a terminal disease, the physician has not
created the patient's medical crisis. 20 7 Although some might argue
that the patients have brought this scourge upon themselves, that
should not preclude the physicians from trying to help people near
death. 208 The source of many degenerative, terminal illnesses is un-
known and is not deemed to be the fault of the patient.20 9
205. See Dr. Bernat & Dr. Mogielnicki, Patient Refusal of Hydration and Nutri-
tion: An Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide or Voluntary, Active Euthanasia, 153
AMA ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2723 (1993) (discussing alternative methods of
assisted suicide).
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (1985) (discussing necessity defense).
Section 3.02 states that "[w]hen the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing
about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the neces-
sity for his conduct, the justification afforded.., is unavailable." Id. For a further
discussion of the necessity defense, see supra notes 133-57 and accompanying text.
207. SeeSanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life, in OWSEI TEMKIN ET AL., MEDICINE,
PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAw 14 (1977) (illustrating physician's humorous response
to stubborn patient).
I have to tell you that I abandon you to your bad constitution, to the
distemper of your bowels, to the corruption of your blood, to the acri-
mony of your bile, and to the feculence of your humors. And I wish that
before four days have passed you may be in an incurable state ... that you
fall sick of bradypepsia . . . go from bradypepsia to dyspepsia . . . from
dyspepsia to apepsia . . . from apepsia to lientery . . . from lientery to
dysentery.... from dysentery to dropsy... from dropsy to the loss of life
to which your folly has led you.
Id.
208. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (allowing one to come to aid of
another).
209. If the physician is at fault in creating a terminal condition, then the phy-
sician cannot assist the patient in committing suicide. If, by an intentional or neg-
ligent operation, the patient is placed near death, then the physician cannot
conveniently escape liability by assisting the patient die. This could introduce in-
teresting complications. If the physician, through a negligent diagnosis, "caused"
or could have prevented the terminal condition, then this physician must not assist
in a consequent suicide because his or her civil liability poses a conflict. Yet, physi-
cian assisted suicide proposals rest on the availability and continued treatment of
the family doctor, but it might be the family doctor who "caused" the affliction. See
generally HENDIN, supra note 2, 252-58 (discussing situation in Netherlands where
physicians "admitted they had actively caused or hastened death without the re-
quest of the patient" in 1000 cases).
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Additionally, when some provision of the law explicitly deals
with the specific situation that presents the choice of evils, then one
may be preempted from claiming a necessity defense.2 10 Only one
state has a physician assisted suicide exemption.2 11 Minnesota has a
double effect exemption,212 and one might argue that any act of
euthanasia or assisted suicide in Minnesota must follow the statu-
tory procedure which allows the physician to relieve severe pain
when death is a foreseeable consequence of the drugs.213 Most
states have not amended their assisted suicide statutes to exempt
physicians.214 Thus, generally speaking, no legislative action pre-
cludes the medical necessity defense in the United States.
F. Balance of Harms
Courts will determine whether assisted suicide is justified or ex-
cusable conduct.215 Justified conduct concerns a theory of utilita-
rian values, that is whether the unlawful act is commendable and
whether society benefits from the act.2 16 Excusable conduct, on the
other hand, concerns a theory of particularized excuse, negating
the individual's moral blameworthiness.2 17 Courts will weigh the
proportionate harm to society resulting from allowing the medical
necessity defense and will review the jeopardy placed on the integ-
210. For a further discussion of applying the statutory provisions of the Model
Penal Code regarding necessity, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
211. Oregon has provided a physician assisted suicide exemption, but this
statute has been ruled unconstitutional by a federal court. For a further discussion
of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, see supra note 186 and accompanying text.
212. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215(3) (a) (West 1996) (exempting health care
provider "who administers, prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to
relieve another person's pain or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure
may hasten or increase the risk of death").
213. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). Irrespective of Dr. Kevorkian's intent to assist in Mr.
Hyde's death by administering poisonous gasses, the jury acquitted the doctor
based on the overall sentiment of the double effect exemption. BROVINS &
OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 225-41. For a futher discussion of double effect, see infra
notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
214. For a discussion of states which have enacted assisted suicide laws, see
supra note 56 and accompanying text.
215. See Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 800-06 (analyzing arguments for and
against active euthanasia and assisted suicide).
216. SeeDREsSLER, supra note 58, at 261 (discussing necessity as "lesser evil" or
"choice of evil" defense available when person is presented with choice between
two evils and must pick one).
217. See id. at 493-99 (discussing principle of excuse).
1996]
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rity of the medical profession as well as other advantages and
disadvantages.21 8
1. The Integrity of the Medical Profession
Physicians must weigh the principles of patient autonomy, the
sanctity of life and the potential consequences of a policy that per-
mits them to collaborate in deaths.219 Physicians often disagree on
diagnosis, treatment and on the probability of miraculous cures.220
An environment of distrust in the medical profession would under-
mine whether the physician is acting in the best interests of the
patient. Some patients may seek the assistance of a physician be-
cause the patient is unable to obtain the drugs for a tranquil death
and may be inept at the attempt, making the situation worse. 221
The patient may possibly harm innocent persons in the attempt, or
the patient may be so physically debilitated as to be unable to suc-
cessfully complete an attempt.222 This places the physician in a
218. A few courts allow the balancing of harms to weigh in favor of preclud-
ing the necessity defense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 575 N.E.2d 741,
745 (Mass. 1991) (refusing to accept necessity defense when weighing use of mari-
juana to alleviate symptoms from scleroderma against potential harm to public).
The court stated that it could not "dismiss the reasonably possible negative impact
of such a judicial declaration on the enforcement of our drug laws.., nor can we
ignore the government's overriding interest in the regulation of such substances."
Id. Most other courts overwhelmingly accept the necessity defense. See KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 860-80 (discussing residual principle ofjustification).
Other courts have held that the determination of sufficient evidence of a med-
ical necessity defense "requires the trial and appellate courts to interpret the evi-
dence most favorably for the defendant." State v. Cole, 874 P.2d 878, 882-83
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994). Additionally, the court stated "[b]ecause the State chal-
lenged the sufficiency of [the defendant's] evidence in support of the medical
necessity defense, the trial court was required to interpret this evidence in a light
most favorable to [the defendant]." Id. at 883.
219. See Steven H. Miles, Physicians and Their Patients'Suicides, 271 JAMA 1786,
1787 (June 8, 1994) (explaining motives of suicide). Miles observed:
Patients' suicides engender anger, guilt, and loss of self-esteem on the
part of treating physicians. Collegial consultation does not mitigate these
feelings. The relevance of these findings for physician-assisted suicide
must be established as was discussed above. The relevance is supported
by the findings of a study of Dutch physicians who assisted suicide that
they felt ill prepared for such acts and that the "heavy emotional bur-
dehs" and psychiatric morbidity from assisting a patient's suicide left
them disinclined to repeat the act.
Id.
220. See id. (noting that "as the dying process progresses and accelerates, we
often lose the strength to help ourselves").
221. See Risley, supra note 185, at 607 (" [M]ost people lack the knowledge and
the means to end their own lives in a way that is acceptable to them. Nor do they
possess the license needed to obtain life-ending substances, even if they knew how
to use them.").
222. Id.
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bind-to assist the suicide or allow the disease to take its toll. The
antiquated Hippocratic Oath, which initially declares allegiance to
Greek gods, prohibits euthanasia: "I will give no deadly medicine
to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel. '223 The American
Medical Association officially opposes euthanasia and physician as-
sisted suicide, but many doctors are supportive in exceptional cir-
223. The Hippocratic Oath states as follows:
I swear by Apollo the Physician, and Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Panacea,
and I take to witness all the gods, and all the goddesses, to keep accord-
ing to my ability and my judgment the following Oath: To consider dear
to me as my parents him who taught me this Art; to live in common with
him and if necessary to share my goods with him; to look upon his chil-
dren as my own brothers, to teach them this Art if they so desire without
fee or written promise; to impart to my sons and the sons of the master
who taught me and the disciples who have enrolled themselves and have
agreed to the rules of the profession, but to these alone, the precepts and
the instruction. I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients ac-
cording to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone. To
please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his
death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure abortion. But I will
preserve the purity of my life and my Art. I will not cut for stone, even for
patients in whom the disease is manifest; I will leave this operation to be
performed by practitioners (specialists in this Art). In every house where
I come, I will enter only for the good of my patients, keeping myself far
from all intentional ill-doing and all seduction, and especially from the
pleasures of love with women or with men, be they free or slaves. All that
may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of
my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be
spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal. If I keep this Oath
faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice my Art, respected by all men
and in all time; but if I swerve from it or violate it, may the reverse be my
lot.
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 767-68 (27th ed. 1988) (emphasis
added).
Many American medical schools either do not insist that the Hippocratic Oath
be taken by graduating doctors or have made changes to the wording of the Oath.
See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing former physician Jack Kevor-
kian's reference to the University of Michigan Medical School). Kevorkian stated:
I never took the oath, and as far as I know it was never officially adminis-
tered to my graduating class in 1952 at the University of Michigan. In-
deed, it is now uncommon for any American medical faculty to insist that
the oath be taken by graduating doctors. That alone renders suspect the
hallowed oath's importance or relevance to modern medical practice.
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cumstances. 224 There are approximately 30,000 suicides a year.2 25
The terminally ill commit approximately three percent of all sui-
cides. 226 For the terminally ill patients, for whom pain medication
does not work, physician assisted suicide would be an option. Nev-
ertheless, the credo for the medical profession is to preserve life,
not destroy it. Physician assisted suicide revolutionizes that medical
credo.
2. Other Disadvantages of Physician Assisted Suicide
Allowing the medical necessity defense may lead to abuses, ag-
gravated practices and a veritable slippery slope.227 History teaches
that widespread euthanasia perpetuates an atmosphere of dis-
easism, ageism and geriatric futility.228 A progression of cases
which embrace the right to die illustrates the legitimacy of the slip-
pery slope concern. One may have the right to forbid life-saving
blood transfusions on First Amendment religious grounds.229 One
has the right to refuse extraordinary and even ordinary medical
treatment, a concept espoused by living wills.230 An inmate has a
224. See Andrew Benton, Comment, Personal Autonomy and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: The Appropriate Response to a Modern Ethical Dilemma, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv.
769, 778 (1993) (stating "[a] growing number of physicians have recognized the
possibility of physician participation in the suicide of a competent, terminally ill
patient"); see also Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hope-
lessly Ill Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 847-48 (1989) (discussing views of 12
physicians who concluded that physician assisted suicide is justifiable and compas-
sionate for terminally ill patients seeking assistance).
225. HE NDIN, supra note 2. at 33. In addition, there are hundreds of
thousands of attempted suicides each year. Id.
226. Id. at 242. Dr. Hendin notes that "the overwhelming majority of termi-
nally ill fight for life to the end." Id. at 243.
227. See Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 812 (discussing Dutch system of euthana-
sia and its rise in abuses leading to "ride on the 'slippery slope"').
228. For a further discussion of the historical approach to euthanasia, see
supra notes 20-55 and accompanying text.
229. See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 (Ill. 1965) (holding
that lower court interfered with patient's constitutional rights by allowing conser-
vator to consent to blood transfusions, which were against express will of patient).
The court concluded that "what has happened here involves a judicial attempt to
decide what course of action is best for a particular individual, notwithstanding
that individual's contrary views based upon religious convictions. Such action can-
not be constitutionally countenanced." Id. at 442.
230. See generally Luis Kutner, The Living Will, Coping with the Historical Event of
Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 39 (1975) (discussing history of living wills and guidelines
for making such wills). Every state recognizes the concept of living wills-docu-
ments stipulating that specified medical procedures should not be used to keep
the patient alive in medical situations. DWORJIN, supra note 104, at 180. Alterna-
tively, health care proxies are documents appointing third parties to make health
care decisions when the patient is disabled. Id.
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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right to deny forced feedings in terminal situations.23 1 The pa-
tient's guardian has a right to refuse life-support systems for food
and water.2 32 Next, medical euthanasia will be allowed for patients
who are physically unable to commit the act themselves.2 33 Dis-
turbing reports have surfaced regarding abusive practices in the
Netherlands. 23 4 One study revealed that in over one thousand
cases, Dutch physicians admitted they had actively caused or has-
tened death without the request of the patient, and that doctors,
nurses and families often pressured the patient to request euthana-
sia.2 35 Additionally, some individuals or cultures prefer that a physi-
cian avoid the question of anticipated death as it undermines the
patient's confidence in the physician's competence.23 6
Case studies have also legitimized the domino theory, in that
one suicide will induce other suicides.23 7 Physician assisted suicide
sentimentalizes a tranquil death, making the living feel they have
231. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 390 (Cal. 1993) ("[We]
find no duty on [the physician] to provide further life sustaining procedures and
therefore decline to authorize him to take any action inconsistent with or contrary
to [the competent inmate's] express choice regarding the course of his medical
treatment.").
232. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App.
1986) (holding that patient has "right to refuse medical treatment even of the life
sustaining variety"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976) (allowing guard-
ian "full power to make decisions with regard to the identity of [patient's] treating
physician").
233. Kamisar, supra note 64, at 36. University of Michigan Professor Yale
Kamisar, a renowned advocate against assisted suicide and euthanasia, wrote: "In a
climate in which suicide is the 'rational' thing to do, or at least a 'reasonable'
option, will it become the unreasonable thing not to do? The noble thing to do?"
Id.
234. See HENDIN, supra note 2, at 250-77 (discussing Netherland's experience
with legalized euthanasia); see also Schanker, supra note 11, at 992-97 (same).
235. HENDIN, supra note 2, at 252. A Dutch commission, headed by Professor
Jan Remmelink, studied the medical practices of euthanasia and issued the "Rem-
melink Report" which summarized alleged abuses. Id. at 252-53. The Remmelink
Commission considered that these cases were not morally troublesome because
the suffering of those patients had become unbearable and they would usually
have died soon anyhow. Id. at 253.
236. See DwoRMKN, supra note 104, at 190 (discussing vulnerability of termi-
nally ill individuals). Dworkin notes that:
Such a person [who is terminally ill] is especially vulnerable to pressure:
he might prefer that a doctor not even raise the question of whether he
would like to consider dying with medical assistance; he might prefer that
the question never arise, or that he not even have the right to request
death. Many of the people who voted against the Washington and Cali-
fornia referendums were worried about putting sick people in that posi-
tion, and some critics of the Dutch schemeclaim that in that country the
elderly are beginning to look upon doctors as their enemies.
Id.
237. See David P. Phillips, The Influence of Suggestion of Suicide: Substantive and
Theoretical Implications of the Werther Effect, 39 Am. Soc. REv. 340, 350-51 (1974)
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missed something by staying alive. Once assisted suicide becomes
policy, the young and the depressed may be susceptible to imitative
influences that glorify and destigmatize suicide.2 38 It is unclear
whether the allowance of physician assisted suicide would increase
the overall suicide rate, but, once it is legal, death becomes a guar-
anteed peaceful future interest-a contingency plan.
The poor might be grossly affected by assisted suicide because
they are notoriously less provided for in the alleviation of pain.2 39
The desire to reduce costs would immediately affect those who can-
not afford the high costs of treatment.2 40 Economic vulnerabilities
would make the poor the ideal candidates for physician assisted sui-
cide and physician-recommended suicide.241 The elderly might
also be susceptible to fraud and deceit.2 4 2 The death experience is
communal and has attractive probate and insurance conse-
quences. 243 Women, too, might suffer in that they outlive men and
may encounter reduced financial resources. 2 " "A system which
fails to care adequately for the living must not be empowered with
the license to kill."
245
(demonstrating that number of suicides rises in statistically significant manner in
month following front page newspaper publicity about particular suicide).
238. See Peter M. Marzuk et al., Increase in Suicide by Asphyxiation in New York
City After the Publication of Final Exit, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1508, 1510 (1993) (not-
ing that after Derek Humphry, founder of Hemlock Society, published his book,
Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying,
describing various ways one can commit suicide, there was significant increase in
number of suicides, which may be attributed to suggestions in that book).
239. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); see Schanker,
supra note 11, at 1005-06 ("An institution providing an indigent patient with care
would be called upon to resist substantial incentives to encourage the patient to
avail himself of euthanasia, including financial savings and the release of resources
to insured patients.").
240. See CANTOR, supra note 120, at 87-89 (noting recent report by respected
group of medical experts recommended that "[f]inancial ruin of the patient's fam-
ily, as well as the drain on resources for treatment of other patients who are not
hopelessly ill should be weighed . . .although the patient's welfare obviously re-
mains paramount").
241. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 851.
242. Id. at 826.
243. See CANTOR, supra note 120, 89 (noting that survivors participating in
decision-making process will not be "oblivious to the resources-physical, emo-
tional, and monetary-being devoted to a dying patient" who has no hope of
recovery).
244. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 853-54.
245. Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 811; see also George J. Annas, Physician-As-
sisted Suicide-Michigan's Temporary Solution, 20 OHio N.U. L. REv. 561, 568 (1993)
("The most powerful argument against the legislative expansion of the power of
physicians to assist patients in suicide is the danger that this greater latitude will
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3. Various Societal Approaches Towards Death
Given the present perception of a health care crisis, patients,
insurers, families and the government are concerned about rising
medical costs. 246 Prolonged health care depletes savings and inher-
itance.2 47 Some medical personnel financially gain from prolonged
patient care.2 48 The current political landscape reflects a society
characterized by technological change, personal autonomy, over-
population and fear of economic turmoil. The sudden mass call for
physician assisted suicide might reflect a public imperative.2 49
result in abuses that disproportionately affect especially vulnerable populations-
the poor, the elderly, women and minorities.").
Dr. Hendin proposes four reasons why euthanasia or physician assisted suicide
would be unwise in America: (1) "The United States is not characterized by either
a legal or medical system that fosters social harmony, but that instead pits one
profession against the other"; (2) Hospitals would be subject to economic pres-
sures to get rid of the terminally ill because of inequitable health plans; (3) The
absence of the "family" doctor eliminates a major source of patient protection; and
(4) Americans have not sufficiently studied the issue and have an insufficient body
of case law to define acceptable parameters for all. HENDIN, supra note 2, at 273-74
(noting also that Americans tendency towards excessive litigation would make eu-
thanasia nightmare for physicians); see also Schanker, supra note 11, at 1003.
Schanker observes:
On the one hand, it is possible to imagine a safe and compassionate ad-
ministration of euthanasia, with physicians and families working together
to create a supportive and loving environment in which to make the cru-
cial decision .... On the other hand, it is equally possible, and perhaps
closer to reality, to imagine deathbed scenes frought with anxiety, con-
flict, and mistrust.
Id.
246. Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 811. An example of cost containment can
be found in a 1991 case where Minnesota physicians filed suit to disconnect the
respirator of an 87 year-old woman whose family insisted on continued care and
life-support systems. ROSENBLAT-r, supra note 11, at 346. Despite the fact that the
physicians demonstrated that the woman suffered an irreversible coma and that
the financial costs of her care amounted to nearly one million dollars a year, they
lost the suit. Id. Minnesota law establishes that a patient has a right to demand
unceasing medical treatment even in an arguably hopeless case. Id.
247. See Tsarouhas, supra note 11, at 811 (noting that "Medicare and Medi-
caid are at risk of financial collapse because of aged population's great demand on
health care services").
248. See BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 37 (citing local newspaper edito-
rial that stated: "The American Medical Association isn't interested in providing a
dignified and inexpensive way to end life, as long as doctors can continue to drag
out a death and empty out the pockets of not only the patient, but those of his
family as well.").
249. Conversely, see HENDIN supra note 2, at 276-77 (discussing opposite view
that public imperative demands rejection of physician assisted suicide). Hendin
observes:
How we deal with illness, age, and decline says a great deal about who and
what we are, both as individuals and as a society. The growing number of
people living to old age and the increasing incidence of depression in
people of all ages presents us with a medical challenge. Our efforts
should concentrate on providing treatment, relieving pain for the intrac-
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The disadvantages of physician assisted suicide may be con-
trolled by well-defined guidelines. To insure trust in the medical
and legal profession, the patient must be entitled to a medical "bill
of rights," which would define the nature of the terminal illness,
explain the diagnosis, suggest the remedies, describe the physical
toll and assess the financial costs. 250 The patient must be allowed
the reciprocal right of consent to accept or reject therapy and treat-
ment.25' The patient has a right to religious, ethnic, cultural and
familial influences in making a decision, yet strict regulations can
insure that the patient is not coerced into committing suicide by
doctors, relatives or friends.2 52 One may seek advisory opinions
from medical ethics boards or from the courts.253 Judicial interven-
tion should be the last resort. " J] udicial intervention... tends to
denigrate the principle of personal autonomy, substituting a species
of legal paternalism for the medical paternalism the concept of in-
formed consent seeks to eschew. '254 Additionally, judicial interven-
tion may create unconstitutional impediments, a prior restraint
upon choice. 255
Others argue that the entire issue of euthanasia is prompted
and guided by an improper restraint by religious dogma. Noted
commentator Glanville Williams, who resurrected the considera-
tion of euthanasia in the 1950s, stated: "[T]he case against eutha-
nasia legislation is inseparably connected to religious convictions
about the sanctity of life and human prerogative to take it. Such a
connection renders the current law deeply suspect as the basis of a
policy in a secular regime." 256
The competence of a person who elects to commit suicide may
be compromised by the onslaught of the illness. Consequently, the
patient must undergo psychiatric examinations and be counseled
on alternatives.257 The patient must reaffirm the decision to com-
tably ill, and, in the case of terminal illness, helping the individual come
to terms with death.
Id.
250. SeeJohn D. Bonnet, Bill of Rights of the Dying Patient, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 27,
28-30 (1975) (providing sample "Bill of Rights" for dying patients).
251. Id. at 29.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 28-29.
254. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 389 (Cal. 1993).
255. Id.
256. See SHERLOCK, supra note 61, at 120 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE
SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 311-19, 333-50 (1957)).
257. BROVINS & OEHMKE, supra note 9, at 162-64. For example, Dr. Kevorkian,
the leading advocate of physician assisted suicide, recommends a procedure con-
sistent with those previously mentioned. His procedure includes efforts to per-
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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mit suicide, but must not be forced to beg. There must be a mean-
ingful doctor-patient relationship so that the doctor has experience
with the patient and the patient's family and can thus rely on the
patient's choice.2 58
In the Netherlands, euthanasia is accepted. Although techni-
cally illegal, Dutch physicians are not prosecuted as long as certain
guidelines are followed. 259 Additionally, the Dutch Reformed
Church has sanctioned euthanasia.2 60 The Dutch guidelines re-
quire a second physician to corroborate the patient's medical con-
dition and competence. 26' Once the doctors agree to perform
euthanasia, the attending physician usually induces a deep sleep
with barbiturates and then injects a muscle-paralyzing drug that
causes cessation of breathing. 262 Frequently, the act of euthanasia
occurs in the patient's home.263 Each year, between 4,000 and
6,000 Dutch patients undergo euthanasia in a nation of some 14.5
million people.264 The great majority of requests are refused by the
suade patients to prolong their lives, clinical diagnosis, second opinions and
exhaustion of all efforts. Id. Dr. Kevorkian's procedure requires videotaped death
counseling with the patient and family, in which he guarantees each patient the
irrevocable right to reverse their decision at any moment, and that the patient
alone must activate the switch to terminate life. Id.
258. Id. Attorney Geoffrey Fieger argues that the current medical practice
offers no greater doctor-patient relationship than the one suggested by Jack Kevor-
kian. Fieger, supra note 86, at 665. Feiger notes:
[M]ost of the medical practice now, if you go into the hospital, deals with
specialists. Specialists have no prior contact with you. The doctor says
"Well, you need a gall bladder surgery, call in the surgeon." The surgeon
comes in on roller skates, he says, "Oh yeah, you need the surgery, sched-
ule it." The first time you really see the guy is in the operating room
when you're unconscious! You never see him again. That's a physician-
patient relationship that's more respectable than Kevorkian spending
months and years with the patient?
Id.
259. See Maurice A.M. de Wachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 22 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 23, 23 (Mar.-Apr. 1992) (discussing Dutch practice of euthanasia). The
Dutch courts and the Royal Dutch Medical Association established the following
guidelines for physicians to follow when practicing assisted suicide or euthanasia:
(1) voluntariness-the patient's request must be persistent, conscious and freely
made; (2) exhaustion-there must exist unbearable suffering that cannot be re-
lieved by any other means; and (3) consultation-the attending physicians must
consult with a colleague. Id. Doctors are expected to report cases of euthanasia as
deaths due to "unnatural causes" and will not be prosecuted if these guidelines are
followed. Id.
260. Id. at 27 (concluding that quality of life is more important than length of
life).
261. Id. at 23 (attending physician must consult with colleague regarding pa-
tient's condition and genuineness and appropriateness of request).
262. NULAND, supra note 93, at 258.
263. de Wachter, supra note 259, at 24.
264. Id. at 23-24.
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doctors because many patients have not exhausted every reasonable
alternative or have failed to satisfy one of the previously mentioned
criteria.2 65
a. Patient Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition
Several doctors propose another alternative to physician as-
sisted suicide that is consistent with existing case law-allowing
death through the refusal of hydration and nutrition.266 These
doctors suggest that death by starvation and dehydration may be
accomplished without suffering because intrinsic thirst and hunger
are usually diminished in terminally ill patients. 2 67 Chronically or
terminally ill patients who wish to gain more control over their
deaths can then refuse to eat and drink and refuse enteral or paren-
teral feedings or hydration. "The failure of the present debate to
include this alternative may be the result of the confusion that
thirst and hunger remain strong drives in terminal illness, and a
misconception that failure to satisfy these drives causes intractable
suffering."2 68 According to these doctors, terminally ill patients dy-
ing of dehydration or lack of nutrition do not suffer, at least in
regards to the stereotypic image of the parched person scrambling
in the desert for water. "In fact, maintaining physiologic hydration
and adequate nutrition is difficult in most seriously ill patients be-
cause intrinsic thirst and hunger are usually diminished or ab-
265. See HENDIN, supra note 2, at 251-54 (discussing reports of Remmelink
Commission on results of euthanasia requests). Hendin notes that despite ac-
cepting euthanasia, prior to 1991 the Dutch did not have hard facts about the
practice. Estimates of the number of euthanasia cases had ranged from 5,000 to
20,000 of the 130,000 deaths in the Netherlands each year. Id. at 251; see also Henk
A.M.J. ten Have &Jos V.M. Welie, Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?, 22 HASTINGS
CTR. RP'. 34-38 (Mar.-Apr. 1992) (discussing research and data of euthanasia prac-
tice in Netherlands).
266. See Bernat & Mogielnicki, supra note 205, at 2723-28. Bernat and
Mogielnicki suggest that:
[E]ducating chronically and terminally ill patients about the feasibility of
patient refusal of hydration and nutrition ... can empower them to con-
trol their own destiny without requiring physicians to reject the taboos on
physician assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia that have ex-
isted for millennia. To be feasible, this alternative requires confirmation
of the preliminary scientific evidence that death by starvation and dehy-
dration need not be accompanied by suffering.
Id. at 2723.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 2726 (discussing natural versus other causes of death).
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sent.12 69 This is a form of passive euthanasia, consistent with prior
case law allowing the withdrawal of food and water.270
b. The Double Effect Principle
The double effect principle permits aggressive medical treat-
ment that has the double effect of alleviating pain as well as the
collateral effect of causing death.2 71 Death is an unfortunate conse-
quence of the means chosen, rather than the ultimate goal, which is
the alleviation of pain.2 72 The basic premise is that the disease kills,
not the medications. As such, double effect represents a compro-
mise, short of explicit euthanasia. Minnesota is one of the few
states that has statutorily adopted a form of this "double effect"
principle. 273 The Minnesota statute bans assisted suicide, but ex-
empts a licensed health care professional "who administers,
prescribes, or dispenses medications or procedures to relieve an-
other person's pain or discomfort, even if the medication or procedure
may hasten or increase the risk of death. .... "274 The Catholic Church,
which also opposes physician assisted suicide, subscribes to the
"double effect" doctrine.275 Some interpret the double effect the-
269. Id.
270. Others, however, disagree that patient refusal of hydration and nutrition
is a benign method towards death. See CANTOR, supra note 120, at 39 (stating that
"feeding or nutrition may carry with it no benefit to the patient, or may even pro-
long a torturous dying process, and thus lose its-usual symbolic cast").
271. KILLING AND LETTING DIE, supra note 4, at 266-67. "The doctrine of the
double effect is based on a distinction between what a man foresees as a result of
his voluntary action and what, in the strictest sense, he intends." Id. at 267. Here
the person administering the drugs foresees the death, but in the strictest sense he
seeks to alleviate pain rather than to cause death. Id. at 270-71. The current law in
Minnesota represents the double effect theory and reads as follows:
Acts or omissions not considered aiding suicide or aiding attempted sui-
cide: (a) A health care provider ... who administers, prescribes, or dis-
penses medications or procedures to relieve another person's pain or
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase
the risk of death, does not violate this section unless the medications or
procedures are knowingly administered, prescribed, or dispensed to
cause death.
MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (1996).
272. See KADISH, supra note 207, at 70-71 (providing example of double effect
principle). "When one uses deadly force against an assailant to save one's own life,
one's action in causing the death of the assailant is not the intended effect, but the
known effect of that action. The intended effect is to remove the threat and no
more." Id.
273. MINN. STAT. § 609.215.
274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2279, at 549 (1994) (stating
double effect principle). According to the Catholic Church:
Even if death is thought imminent, the ordinary care owed to a sick per-
son cannot be legitimately interrupted. The use of painkillers to alleviate
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ory as a charade for euthanasia, but the principle does legitimize
the prevalent use of excessive morphine which is administered by
physicians who know or suspect that it will cause death.276
The "double effect" and "patient refusal of hydration and nu-
trition" theories are alternative approaches to death which may
minimize the fears generated by the speculative disadvantages of
physician assisted suicide. These alternatives demonstrate that
there are multiple defensible methods in the dying process.277 The
"double effect" theory was successfully employed in the trilogy of
cases against Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Defense attorney Geoffrey Fieger
argued that Dr. Kevorkian's intent in assisting the suicides was to
relieve suffering, not cause death. Death was a necessary collateral
consequence.
G. A Jury Question
A necessity case invariably concerns a question of values. Typi-
cal necessity cases are not difficult because the choice would seem
apparent. For instance, breaking the speeding laws would seem
reasonable when one needs to rush another to the hospital. But
when the question of values concerns a moral issue, people may
reasonably disagree.278 A trial judge need only decide whether the
the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening their days, can
be morally in conformity with human dignity if death is not willed as
either an end or a means, but only foreseen and tolerated as inevitable.
Palliative care is a special form of disinterested charity. As such it should
be encouraged.
Id. The "double effect" doctrine conflicts with the legal proscription of second
degree murder or involuntary manslaughter. If one administers pain medication
knowing that there is a likelihood of death, then one may be prosecuted for the
extremely reckless act of murder or the reckless act of involuntary manslaughter.
See DRESSLER, supra note 58, at 478. Dressler states that a person kills recklessly if
he or she consciously disregards substantial and unjustifiable risk to human life.
This constitutes involuntary manslaughter. Id. When such recklessness is extreme,
i.e., when the risk of death is very great, and the justification for taking the risk is
weak or nonexistent, the actor is guilty of murder. Id.
276. See KILLING AND LETTING DIE, supra note 4, at 270-71 (discussing problem
of abortion and doctrine of double effect).
277. See DR. JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION-MEDICIDE, THE GOODNESS OF
PLANNED DEATH, 203, 214, 233, 241-44 (1991) (discussing use of prescription drugs
in assisted suicide). Certain physicians like Jack Kevorkian advocate the creation
of a board-certified medical specialty, "obidiatry," based on a four year medical
residency that would train physicians in the practice of "medicide." Id.; see also
HENDIN, supra note 2, at 248 (describing hypothetical process, under Dr. Kevor-
kian's vision, that patient would follow until end of patient's life).
278. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 18, at 294-96. As the historical section has
shown, differences in the philosophies of life affect the resolution in the manner
of death. Id.
720 [Vol. 41: p. 663
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question of values presented is frivolous and unsupporive.27 9 The
jury, as the "conscience of the community," should then decide
whether the accused made an objectively correct choice of
values.280
The weakness in proofs of one of the necessity conditions does
not alone disprove the defense nor automatically preclude an in-
struction on the defense.28' The conditions are matters which go
to the weight and credibility of the defense, which are jury ques-
tions.28 2 When the facts support the defense and when the accused
requests the instruction, he or she has a constitutional right to have
the trier of fact instructed on the defense.28 3 Once the accused has
presented some supporting evidence, the jury must determine its
sufficiency. The accused bears the burden of proving the existence
of necessity because it is an affirmative defense which rests within
279. Id. at 296.
280. Id. For a discussion of cases regarding medical necessity, see supra note
166-74 and accompanying text.
281. See People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1977) (discussing jury's role of
determining necessity defense of prison escape). "The rule is well settled that a
court will not weigh the evidence where the question is whether an instruction is
justified." Id. (citations omitted). The absence of one or more of the elements
listed in People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App 1974) (regarding admissi-
bility of factors of necessity defense to prison escape), is not dispositive. Id. at 114.
This would not necessarily mandate a finding that the defendant could not assert
the defense of necessity. The absence of one of the Lovercamp preconditions does
not alone disprove the claim of necessity and should not, therefore, automatically
preclude an instruction on the defense. Id. at 115.
282. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15 (1979) (recognizing
jury's duty to assess evidence presented.in necessity case of prison escape). Ac-
cording to the Court:
The Anglo-Saxon tradition of criminal justice, embodied in the
United States Constitution and in federal statutes, makes jurors the
judges of the credibility of testimony offered by witnesses. It is for them,
generally, and not for appellate courts, to say that a particular witness
spoke the truth or fabricated a cock-and-bull story.... It is the jury that is
the judge of whether the prisoner's account of his reason for flight is true
or false. But precisely because a defendant is entitled to have the credi-
bility of his testimony, or that of witnesses called on his behalf, judged by
the jury, it is essential that the testimony given or proffered meet a mini-
mum standard as to each element of the defense so that, if ajury finds it
to be true, it would support an affirmative defense-here that of duress
or necessity.
Id.
283. See id. at 415 (discussing the defense of necessity in prison escape cases).
The Court held:
[Wlhere a criminal defendant is charged with escape and claims that he
is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity, he must
proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as
soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.
1996]
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the defendant's knowledge and understanding.28 4 Once the ac-
cused submits and proves the defense, the prosecution must rebut
it beyond a reasonable doubt.28 5
V. CONCLUSION
Physician assisted suicide is a response to the capitulation from
a disease, not an act of criminal complicity. Nearly every criminal
prosecution for physician assisted suicide has resulted in an acquit-
tal, reflecting the jury's willingness to nullify the law and adopt a de
facto medical necessity defense. A necessity defense places trust in
the jury to determine whether the physician reasonably believes
that aiding a suicide would be a lesser evil than allowing the patient
to suffer.286
Medical necessity balances choice, values and the law. To as-
certain that measure of balance, an analogy is gained from the
"evolving standards of decency" enunciated in death penalty cases
that prohibit the excessive infliction of pain during a state execu-
tion.28 7 State imposed executions are frighteningly similar to na-
ture's imposed terminal diseases. Both present the near certainty
284. For a discussion of the medical necessity defense, see supra notes 133-174
and accompanying text. The legal strategy, however, concerns whether the ac-
cused will elect to prove the affirmative defense rather than rest on a jury nullifica-
tion verdict. If the prosecution charges assisted suicide as a form of murder, then
the accused stands a good chance at nullification because historically juries have
acquitted physicians of murder. For a discussion of the acquittal of Dr.Jack Kevor-
kian, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. Conceivably, a defendant can fail to
meet his or her burden of proof in satisfying all of the elements to the jury. See
ROSENBLATT, supra note 11, at 13-15, 289-90 (regarding tactical decision to run
defense or rest with jury nullification).
285. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 n.19 (1976) (recognizing
that "the trend over the years appears to have been to require the prosecution to
disprove affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt").
286. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 18, at 294-301. As Judge Leventhal wrote
when rejecting the jury nullification defense:
Human frailty being what it is, a prosecutor disposed by unworthy motives
could likely establish some basis in fact for bringing charges against any-
one he wants to book, but the jury system operates in fact ... so that the
jury will not convict when they empathize with the defendant, as when
the offense is one they see themselves as likely to commit, or consider
generally acceptable or condonable under the mores of the community.
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1131-32 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
287. Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-15 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding
that hanging obese man posed significant risk of decapitation and thus constituted
cruel and unusual punishment). Some forms of hanging, for instance, involve the
painful process 9f strangulation, causing a dislocated vertebrae and crushed spinal
cord. Id. Inadvertent decapitation of an excessively obese man might have added
the ignominy of blood spurting uncontrollably from a headless shoulder. But see
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir.) (holding that execution byjudicial
hanging is not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
[Vol. 41: p. 663
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of death and both present tortuous circumstances. The courts are
sensitive even to brutal murderers who claim cruel and unusual
punishment in the manner of their execution. 288 Those suffering
from the compelling inequities of nature's diseases deserve similar
compassion in the manner of their deaths. Many terminally ill peo-
ple do not wish to suffer unnecessarily. As the court in Campbell v.
Wood 289 noted regarding a state execution: "If medical science has
developed a method of terminating life relatively painlessly and
peacefully, and with comparative dignity, the Constitution requires
that we employ that procedure rather than the savage, ugly, and
antiquated methods of earlier times." 290 In many states, there is
some choice in the manner of execution. A terminally ill patient
seeks a similar choice.
A successful necessity defense drives legislative reform. For in-
stance, once necessity was recognized as a valid defense to prison
escape to avoid sexual assault, a state legislature reformed prison
conditions.291 Once medical necessity was recognized as a valid de-
fense in drug cases to allow marijuana to alleviate the effects of dis-
eases, the Washington state legislature enacted a statute authorizing
the medicinal uses of marijuana to alleviate glaucoma and can-
cer.292 Many of the proposed right-to-die statutes incorporate the
288. See, e.g., Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (hold-
ing that gas chamber violated Eighth Amendment prohibition). The Fierro court
noted that:
[T] he key question to be answered in a challenge to a method of execu-
tion is how much pain the inmate suffers.... Death where unconscious-
ness is "likely to be immediate or within a matter of seconds," is
apparently within constitutional limits. . . . [T~he persistence of con-
sciousness "for over a minute" or for "between a minute and a minute-
and-a-half, but no longer than two minutes" might be outside constitu-
tional boundaries.
Id. at 1410-11 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). The court further deter-
mined that "the objective evidence of pain and suffering upon administration of
lethal gas demonstrates that death by [gas] is not instantaneous.... [I]nmates are
likely to be conscious for anywhere from fifteen seconds to one minute from the
time that the gas strikes their face." Id. at 1413. During executions by gas, the
primary cause of intense physical pain is cellular suffocation, which includes symp-
toms of intense chest pains and exquisitely painful muscle spasms. Id.
289. 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
290. Id. at 702.
291. See People v. Harmon, 220 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974), affd,
232 N.W.2d 187 (Mich. 1975) (declaring that successful duress defense of prison
escape would result in fewer escapes and spur penal reform).
292. See State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (noting
response of Washington state legislature to District of Columbia case of United
States v. Randal4 104 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 1976),
which permitted medical necessity defense where defendant used marijuana to
relieve pain attributed to glaucoma). In response to Diana, the Washington state
legislature enacted the Controlled Substances Therapeutic Research Act recogniz-
1996]
61
Carter: Knight in the Duel with Death: Physician Assisted Suicide and the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 663
medical necessity factors. Similarly, a successful medical necessity
defense would prompt the medical profession and the state to re-
examine and reform the health care industry for the terminally ill.
The preceding historical analysis of suicide, assisted suicide
and euthanasia reveals a natural anthropological defense in the
duel with death. Forfeiture policies of Roman and English law,
American statutory schemes and jury verdicts of acquittal have miti-
gated or eliminated the punishment for those who have committed
and assisted suicides based on the ravages of a terminal disease.
The proposed medical necessity defense assimilates the historical
roots that recognizes medical determinism in the beginning stages
of one's death. History has sustained "euthanatic suicide"293 as an
anthropological defense to self-murder.2 94 Suicide is generally the
wrong thing to do, but euthanatic suicide from a crippling, termi-
nal infirmity is not suicide to escape a miserable life, but suicide to
escape a miserable death. The invocation of the medical necessity
defense will provide a governing standard of conduct, provoke leg-
islative reform, circumvent constitutional quagmires, provide an eq-
uitable remedy in justified cases and sanction the efforts of those
who wish to revolutionize the legal manner of death.
ing the medicinal uses of marijuana to alleviate glaucoma and cancer. See Diana,
604 P.2d at 1316-17 (citing Controlled Substances and Therapeutic Research Act,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51.010 (West 1996), effective Mar. 27, 1979).
In the November 1996 elections, the voters in California and Arizona ap-
proved laws allowing marijuana to be prescribed for medical purposes. Kevin
Johnson, Doctors Told Not to Prescribe Marijuana, USA TODAY, at Al (Dec. 31, 1996).
The effect of the statutes is unclear because White House drug czar Barry McCaf-
frey and Attorney General Janet Reno have issued warnings to physicians in Ari-
zona and California that they could be charged with a federal crime and have
prescription writing privileges revoked if they prescribe marijuana. Id.
293. See CHORON, supra note 25, at 103 (suggesting that physician assisted sui-
cide is "euthanatic suicide" and that euthanatic suicide is not suicide in proper
meaning of this word). Moreover, the Justinian Roman Codes have long excused
"acts done under duress" and acts done from the compulsion of outside forces. 1 THE
DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN, supra note 22, at 113. ("[D]uress is to be understood not as
any alarm whatever but as fear of a serious evil.")
294. LESTER G. CROCKER, AN AGE OF CIsIs 75-77 (1959). Montesquieu pro-
vides an example of the dilemma as follows:
Laws are "the necessary relationships that derive from the nature of
things." Man, in other words, is regarded as a part of nature, and the
explanation of historical events is sought in the facts of the natural world.
History becomes anthropology, a natural history of man, in which institutions
appear . . . "as the necessary effects of natural cause."
Id. (emphasis added); see also SHERLOCK, supra note 61, 177-78 ("To transfer the
right to kill oneself from nature to society requires transferring this natural man as
well.").
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